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State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to G. Richard Bevan 
Dismiss and Memorandum 
NIELSEN State's Response to Defendant's Motion to G. Richard Bevan 
Dismiss lndictment 
Camera in the Courtroom request granted for G. Richard Bevan 
4126106 hrg. - KMVT 
Order Clarifying Trial Scheduling and Pretrial G. Richard Bevan 
Deadlines 
-/2412006 MlSC 
.I2512006 ORDR 
HRSC 
SUPR 
TUBBS 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduied G. Richard Bevan 
06/01/2006 09:OO AM) Jury Questionnaire 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
NIELSEN 
'ate: 81 17 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
(me. 11.26 AM ROA Report 
age 3 of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
User: COOPE 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
'ate Code User Judae 
CMIN YOCHAM Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: G. Richard Bevan 
4/26/2006 Time: 9:06 am Court reporter: Virginia 
Bailey 
Document sealed 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: G. Richard Bevan 
4/26/2006 Time: 10:24 am Court reporter: Virginia 
Bailey 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/26/2006 G. Richard Bevan 
1O:OO AM: Case Taken Under Advisement 
CMIN YOCHAM 
ADVS YOCHAM 
SUPR NIELSEN Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
Order To Extend Discovery Deadline G. Richard Bevan 
Stipulation To Extend Discovery Deadline G. Richard Bevan 
ORDR 
STlP 
CONT Continued (Pretrial Conference 0611212006 G. Richard Bevan 
1 1 :OO AM) 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan YOCHAM 
MCMULLEN SUPR 
SUPR 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
NIELSEN Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And G. Richard Bevan 
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Response To Request For Discoveryldefendant G. Richard Bevan 
ROBR TUBBS 
SUPR NIELSEN 
RESD 
W ITN 
SUPR 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
State's Witness List G. Richard Bevan 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Hearing result for Status held on 0511 512006 G. Richard Bevan 
08:32 AM: Hearing Held 
Court Minutes G. Richard Bevan 
HRHD YOCHAM 
CMlN 
CONT 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM Continued (Jurv Trial 0611912006 01:30 PM) 8 G. Richard Bevan , . 
days 
6120106 - 6/23/06 & 
6/27/2006 - 6130106 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled G. Richard Bevan 
06/15/2006 09:OO AM) Jury Selection 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
HRSC YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
AGUIRRE 
AGUIRRE 
NIELSEN 
NlELSEN 
YOCHAM 
MlSC 
MlSC 
MOTN 
NOHG 
OPiN 
Medical Records picked up by M.Phinney G. Richard Bevan 
Certification of Medical Records Received G. Richard Bevan 
Motion in Limine 
Notice Of Hearing 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
Memorandum Decision and Order R.E. G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Indictment On 
Legal Grounds 
ate: 81 97 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
ime: 11:26 AM ROA Report 
age4of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina. Juan Carlos Fuentes 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate Code 
/24/2006 OPlN 
User Judge 
Memorandum Decision and Order R.E. G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Indictment 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled G. Richard Bevan 
06/01/2006 01 :30 PM) Jury Questionnaire 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Questionnaire's G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 6/1/2006 Time: 8:56 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on G. Richard Bevan 
06/01/2006 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Jury 
Questionnaire 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on G. Richard Bevan 
06/01/2006 09:OO AM: Hearing Held Jury 
Questionnaire 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Ex-Parte Motion For Compulsory Attendance OF G. Richard Bevan 
Witness Joel Peterson 
Affidavit Of Marilyn B. Paul In Support of Ex-Parte G. Richard Bevan 
Motion For Compulory Attendance Of Witness 
Joel Peterson 
Ex-Parte Motion To Transport G. Richard Bevan 
Order To Transport G. Richard Bevan 
Order For Compulsory Attendance of Witness G. Richard Bevan 
Joel Peterson 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Dennis Puilin 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Chris Fullmer 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Curtis Gambrel 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Tracey Perreira 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Patti Pohweder 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Ryan Howe 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Eric Steele 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Charles Miller 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Clinton Doerr 
YOCHAM 
/26/2006 SUPR 
/30/2006 SUPR 
13 112006 HRSC 
1112006 CMlN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
HRHD YOCHAM 
HRHD YOCHAM 
/2/2006 SUPR 
/5/2006 MOTN 
AFFD 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
MOTN 
ORDR 
ORDR 
NIELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
NIELSEN SUBR 
NIELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
NIELSEN SUBR 
NIELSEN 
ate: 007 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11 :26 AM ROA Report 
age 5 of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
User. COOPE 
jtate of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate Code 
'512006 SUER 
User Judge 
NIELSEN Subpoena Returned 
Steve Benkula 
Subpoena Returned 
Shrilene Aguirre 
Subpoena Returned 
Craig Stotts 
Subpoena Returned 
ichelle Wyatt 
Motion in Limine Regarding Bruton 
Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Motion to 
Dismiss Indictment 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Stipulation To Exclude Evidence 
Motion To Withdraw Objection To Admission Of 
Call Detail Records (Motion in Limine) 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Subpoena Returned 
Johnny Shores 
Subpoena Returned 
Christina Pierre 
Order To Exclude Evidence 
Order To Withdraw Objection To Admission OF 
Call Detail Records 
Subpoena Returned 
Jeremiah Schmidt 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Amended Supplemental Response To 
Request For Discovery 
Subpoena Returned 
Jay Jr. Martindale 
Subpoena Returned 
Jake Degarmo 
Subpoena Returned 
Art Martinez 
Subpoena Returned 
Debbie Heck 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Motion To Transport 
G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
MOTN 
MOTN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
G. Richard Bevan SUPR NIELSEN 
STiP 
MOTN 
RKLlNE 
RKLlNE 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
1612006 SUPR NIELSEN G. Richard Bevan 
SUBR 
SUBR 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
ORDR 
ORDR 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
G. Richard Bevan NIELSEN 
;!8/2006 SUPR 
SUPR 
NIELSEN G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan SUBR NIELSEN 
G. Richard Bevan NIELSEN 
MCMULLEN G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan MCMULLEN 
G. Richard Bevan SUPR MCMULLEN 
SUPR MCMULLEN G. Richard Bevan 
MCMULLEN G. Richard Bevan SUPR 
P 
i> 
G. Richard Bevan 
ate: 81' j7 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11:26 AM ROA Report 
age6of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina. Juan Carlos Fuentes 
state of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate Code 
'1 212006 HRHD 
User 
YOCHAM 
Judge 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on G. Richard Bevan 
06/12/2006 11:OO AM: Hearing Held IN 
CHAMBERS 
HRSC 
SUPR 
NlNT 
SUBR 
SUBR 
YOCHAM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
06/14/2006 04:OO PM) 404 B Evidence 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Notice Of Intent to Present 404 (b) Evidence at 
Trial 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bovan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
Subpoena Returned 
Dave Ramstead 
Subpoena Returned 
Wendy Walter 
State's Additional Witness List NIELSEN 
NIELSEN Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
11 312006 SUPR 
SUPR NIELSEN 
SUBR 
MiSC 
NIELSEN Subpoena Returned 
Dr. Glen Gaben 
BARTLETT Pretrial Conference Memorandum Pursuant to 
I.C.R. 18 
YOCHAM 
NIELSEN 
Jury Seating Chart G. Richard Bevan 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Phillip Flieger 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Phillip Warren 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Romeo Trevino 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Douglas Hughes 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Frank Neumeyer 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Mark Marvin 
State's Second Additional Witness List G. Richard Bevan 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion for 404 B G. Richard Bevan 
Evidence Hearing date: 611412006 Time: 425  pm 
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions G. Richard Bevan 
Witness List G. Richard Bevan 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Dawn Shores 9 
MlSC 
11412006 SUBR 
SUBR NIELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
SUBR NlELSEN 
NIELSEN SUBR 
SUBR NIELSEN 
WlTN 
CMlN 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
WlTN 
SUPR 
SUBR NIELSEN 
ate: 8 r  )7 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11.26 AM ROA Report 
age 7 of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate Code 
'1 412006 SUPR 
MOTT 
HRHD 
SUPR 
11 512006 SUPR 
CMlN 
CMiN 
HRHD 
ORDR 
ORDR 
11 612006 CMIN 
OPlN 
MlSC 
MlSC 
11 912006 OPlN 
CMlN 
MlSC 
ROBR 
ORDR 
JTST 
User 
NIELSEN 
FERCH 
YOCHAM 
BARTLETT 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
NiELSEN 
YOCHAM 
Judge 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Motion To Transport G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on G. Richard Bevan 
0611412006 04:OO PM: Hearing Held 404 B 
Evidence 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion Hearing date: G. Richard Bevan 
611 512006 Time: 8:56 am Court reporter: Virginia 
Bailey 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Selection G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 611 512006 Time: 950 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on G. Richard Bevan 
0611 512006 09:OO AM: Hearing Held Jury 
Selection 
Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions G. Richard Bevan 
Order To Transport (Phillip Warren) G. Richard Bevan 
Order To Transport (Jeremiah Schmidt) G. Richard Bevan 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Selection Day 2 G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 6/16/2006 Time: 8:22 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Opinion R.E. Defendant's Motion TO Reconsider G. Richard Bevan 
It's Decision To Dismiss Gran Jury Indictment 
Exhibit List G. Richard Bevan 
Premptory Challenges G. Richard Bevan 
Jury Roil Call G. Richard Bevan 
Memorandum Decision and Order R.E. Motion To G. Richard Bevan 
Present Rule 404(b) Evidence 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
date: 611912006 Time: 1:22 pm Court reporter: 
Virginia Bailey 
Preiiminary Jury Instructions G. Richard Bevan 
Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And G. Richard Bevan 
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding 
Order G. Richard Bevan 
Supplemental Exhibit List G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 0611912006 G. Richard Bevan 
01:30 PM: Jury Trial Started 8 days 
6120106 - 6/23/06 & 
6/27/2006 - 6130106 
ate: f 307 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11.26 AM ROA Report 
age 8 of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
,ate Code User 
I1 912006 ROBR YOCHAM 
/20/2006 CMlN YOCHAM 
SUBR NIELSEN 
ROBR BARTLETT 
121/2006 CMlN YOCHAM 
ROBR YOCHAM 
SUPR NIELSEN 
/22/2006 CMlN YOCHAM 
SUBR FERCH 
/23/2006 CMlN YOCHAM 
SUBR NIELSEN 
,12612006 MiSC 
SUBR 
i/27/2006 CMlN 
HRSC 
HRHD 
;I2812006 CMlN 
i/29/2006 CMlN 
MlSC 
MISC 
$/30/2006 NOST 
TUBBS 
NIELSEN 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And 
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 2 
Hearing date: 6/20/2006 Time: 838  am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Subpoena Returned 
Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And 
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Triai Day 3 
Hearing date: 6/2f/2006 Time: 8:31 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And 
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 4 
Hearing date: 6/22/2006 Time: 9:05 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Subpoena Returned 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 5 
Hearing date: 6/23/2006 Time: 822  am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Subpoena Returned 
Phillip Warren 
06-23-06 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
Camera in the courtroom request granted to G. Richard Bevan 
KMVT for 6127 thru duration of trial. 
Subpoena Returned G. Richard Bevan 
Bill Hanchey 
Court Minutes Hearing type: ~ u r y   rial Day 6 G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 6/27/2006 Time: 8:21 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/27/2006 09:OO G. Richard Bevan 
AM) 4 days 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/27/2006 G. Richard Bevan 
09:OO AM: Hearing Held 4 days 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 7 G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 6/28/2006 Time: 8:43 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 8 G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 6/29/2006 Time: 8:31 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Final Seating Chart G. Richard Bevan 
Supplemental Jury Instructions G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Sentencing Hearing And Order G. Richard Bevan 
Regarding Preparation For Sentencing Hearing 
Verdict G. Richard Bevan 
ate: 81 )7 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11 :26 AM ROA Report 
age9of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
State of idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate 
13012006 
Code User 
MiSC YOCHAM 
MlSC YOCHAM 
MlSC YOCHAM 
HRSC YOCHAM 
WlTN YOCHAM 
MlSC COOPE 
ORDR YOCHAM 
MOTN NIELSEN 
NOHG NiELSEN 
HRSC YOCHAM 
ORDR YOCHAM 
CONT YOCHAM 
TRAN YOCHAM 
CONT YOCHAM 
HRSC YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
SUBC NiELSEN 
MPTR QUAM 
CMlN COOPE 
ORTR YOCHAM 
LETT YOCHAM 
PETN YOCHAM 
ORDR YOCHAM 
HRHD YOCHAM 
CMIN COOPE 
TRAN YOCHAM 
VRNF NIELSEN 
H RVC YOCHAM 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
Final Jury Instructions G. Richard Bevan 
Plaintiff's Exhibit List G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant's Exhibit List G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 09/22/2006 G. Richard Bevan 
09:OO AM) 
Witness List G. Richard Bevan 
Final Jury Seating Chart (Alternates) G. Richard Bevan 
Order For Preparation of Reporter's Transcript at G. Richard Bevan 
County Expense 
Motion to Extend Time for Filing of Motion for G. Richard Bevan 
New Trial 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/26/2006 01 :30 G. Richard Bevan 
PM) To Extend Time For Filing Of Motion For 
New Trial 
Order Returning Property To investigating Law G. Richard Bevan 
Enforcement Agency 
Continued (Motion 07/28/2006 01 :30 PM) To G. Richard Bevan 
Extend Time For Filing Of Motion For New Trial 
Partial Trial Transcript Filed of June 29, 2006 G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing result for Motion heid on 07/28/2006 G. Richard Bevan 
01:30 PM: Continued To Extend Time For Filing 
Of Motion For New Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0811 112006 10:30 G. Richard Bevan 
AM) For New Trial 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
Substitution Of Counsel G. Richard Bevan 
Motion For Order Preparing Pre-Trial And Trial G. Richard Bevan 
Transcripts 
Court Minutes G. Richard Bevan 
Order For Preparation of Pre-Trial and Trial G. Richard Bevan 
Transcripts 
Letter from I.D.O.C. G. Richard Bevan 
Petition For Order Approving Payment of Attorney G. Richard Bevan 
Fees 
Order Approving Payment Of Attorney Fees G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/1112006 G. Richard Bevan 
10:30 AM: Hearing Held For New Trial 
Court Minutes G. Richard Bevan 
Pretrial Proceedings Transcript Filed G. Richard Bevan 
Victims Rights Notification Form G.  Richard Bevan 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 09/22/2006 G. Richard Bevan : ? 
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated L L. 
,ate: 81 D7 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11:26 AM ROA Report 
age 10 of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
late Code User Judoe 
11 112006 TRAN 
11 512006 TRAN 
YOCHAM Reporter's Transcript Fiied 
Jury Triai Volume 1 
Reporters Transcript Filed 
Jury Triai Volume 2 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 11 912006 HRSC Hearing Scheduied (Motion to Withdraw G. Richard Bevan 
10113/2006 11 :00 AM) 
Motion To Withdraw G. Richard Bevan MOTN 
AFFD 
MOTN 
AFFD 
QUAM 
QUAM 
QUAM 
QUAM 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Withdraw G. Richard Bevan 
Motion For Appointment Of Private lnvestigator G. Richard Bevan 
Affidavit in Support Of Motion For Appointment Of G. Richard Bevan 
Private lnvestigator 
12012006 CONT YOCHAM Continued (Motion to Withdraw 0912112006 G. Richard Bevan 
01:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
NOHG 
121 12006 CMiN 
NiELSEN 
YOCHAM Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Withdraw 
Hearing date: 9/21/2006 Time: 1:30 pm Court 
reporter: Court Reporter 
Document sealed 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion for Withdraw 
Hearing date: 912112006 Time: 1:30 pm Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
CMlN YOCHAM G. Richard Bevan 
HRHD YOCHAM Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw heid on 
09/21/2006 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 1 110812006 
09:OO AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan HRSC YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan ~12612006 TRAN Reporter's Transcript Fiied Jury Trial 
Volume Ill 
Motion for psychatric testing 011 312006 MOTN 
AFFD 
FERCH 
FERCH 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan Affidavit in support of Motion To Continue and 
Motion for psychatric testing 
Motion To Continue MOCT 
STlP 
011 712006 ORDR 
ORCO 
1011 912006 CONT 
FERCH 
FERCH 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
Stipulation psychatric testing 
Order Psychiatric Testing 
Order To Continue 
Continued (Sentencing 0110412007 09:OO AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
111112006 HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Status 1110612006 03:30 
PM) motion to withdraw 
Motion To Withdraw MOWD 
AFFD 
LETT 
FERCH 
FERCH 
COOPE 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan Affidavit in support of Motion To Withdraw 
Letter from Juan Pina G. Richard Bevan . ,-, 
I d  
ate: 007 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 11 :26 AM ROA Report 
age11 of13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate Code User Judge 
1 /6/2006 HRHD YOCHAM Hearing result for Status held on 11/06/2006 G. Richard Bevan 
03:30 PM: Hearing Held motion to withdraw 
CMlN YOCHAM Court Minutes G. Richard Bevan 
ORDR YOCHAM Order Granting Motion Leave To Withdraw As G.  Richard Bevan 
Attorney Of Record For Defendant And Notifying 
Defendant of Further Responsibilities 
1/9/2006 MEMO COOPE Notation from Richard Smith Ph. D. G. Richard Bevan 
111 612006 LETT COOPE Letter to Carlos 
111 712006 LETT COOPE Letter from Court to Mr. Pina 
1/27/2006 LETT YOCHAM Letter from Juan Pina 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
2/5/2006 ORDR YOCHAM Order Appointing Substitute Counsel Pursuant To G. Richard Bevan 
I.C. 19-856 
ORDR YOCHAM Order Document Sealed G. Richard Bevan 
Document sealed 
211 812006 CONT YOCHAM Continued (Sentencing 0211312007 09:OO AM) G. Richard Bevan 
YOCHAM Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
MOCO YOCHAM Motion To Continue G. Richard Bevan 
11812007 ORAS TUBES Order Of REAssignment Robert J. Elgee 
CHJG TUBES Change Assigned Judge Robert J. Elgee 
12312007 CHJG TUBBS Change Assigned Judge 
I3012007 MOCT AGUIRRE Motion To Continue Sentencing 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
MOTN AGUiRRE Motion for Appointment of Psychologist G. Richard Bevan 
Document sealed 
1212007 CONT YOCHAM Continued (Sentencing 0412012007 09:OO AM) G. Richard Bevan 
HRSC YOCHAM Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/09/2007 09:OO G. Richard Bevan 
AM) for new trial 
ORDR YOCHAM Order For Appointment Of Psychologist G. Richard Bevan 
Document sealed 
ORDR YOCHAM Order Continuing Sentencing G. Richard Bevan 
LETT COOPE Letter from Juan Pina G. Richard Bevan 
i1912007 NOHG NIELSEN Notice Of Hearing Re Motion for New Trial G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
NOHG NIELSEN Notice Of Sentencing Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
!/I 612007 MOTN NIELSEN Motion for New Trial 
MOTN NIELSEN Motion for Reiease of Property 
G. Richard Bevan 
G. Richard Bevan 
MEMO NIELSEN Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial G. Richard Bevan 
1/6/2007 MlSC TUBES Camera in the Courtroom request Granted to G. Richard Bevan 
KMVT for 3/9/07 hrg. 
1/7/2007 OBJC NIELSEN State's Ojection to Defendant's Motion for New G. Richard Bevan 
Trial and Memorandum I F 
- - t  
ate: 81- :7 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
 me: 11:26 AM ROA Report 
age 12of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
User: COOPE 
State of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate Code User Judge 
NlNT 
CMiN 
CONT 
NlELSEN Notice Of Intent to Present Evidence in G. Richard Bevan 
Aggravation of Sentencing 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
date: 31812007 Time: 10:40 am 
Continued (Motion 03/09/2007 03:OO PM) for G. Richard Bevan 
new triai 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/09/2007 G. Richard Bevan 
03:OO PM: Hearing Heid for new triai 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM HRHD 
CMlN Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion for New Trial G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 3/9/2007 Time: 3:10 pm Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Memorandum Decision and Order R.E. G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial 
Supplemental Response To Request For G. Richard Bevan 
Discovery 
YOCHAM 
OPIN 
SUPR 
MiSC 
PSR 
COOPE 
NlELSEN 
TUBBS Camera in the Courtroom Request Granted for G. Richard Bevan 
4120107 Hearing. KMVT 
Presentence Report G. Richard Bevan 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any G. Richard Bevan 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Andy Parnes Receipt number: 7009215 Dated: 
411 312007 Amount: $1 .OO (Cash) 
Addendum Presentence investigation Report G. Richard Bevan 
Addendum Presentence investigation Report G. Richard Bevan 
Camera in the Courtroom Request G. Richard Bevan 
Granted-Times News for 4120107 hrg. 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Sentencing Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
date: 412012007 Time: 9:00 am Court reporter: 
Virginia Bailey 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 0412012007 G. Richard Bevan 
09:OO AM: Hearing Heid 
Civil Judgment (Additional Fine) For Crime of G. Richard Bevan 
Violence I.C. 19-5307 
Order For DNA Sample and Thumbprint G. Richard Bevan 
Impression 
Sentenced To Pay Fine (118-4001-1 Murder i) G. Richard Bevan 
Judgment of Conviction Upon A Jury Verdict of G. Richard Bevan 
Guiity To One Feiony Count, And Order of 
Commitment 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-1 Murder I) G. Richard Bevan 
Confinement terms: Penitentiary determinate: 30 
years. 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing in G. Richard Bevan 
Chambers Hearing date: 412012007 Time: 9:17 
am Court reporter: Virginia Baiiey 
YOCHAM 
HATCH 
MiSC 
MlSC 
MiSC 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
TUBBS 
CMiN YOCHAM 
YOCHAM HRHD 
ORDR YOCHAM 
ORDR YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
YOCHAM 
SNPF 
JDMT 
YOCHAM SNiC 
CMiN 
ate: ' 'I07 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ime: 17:26 AM ROA Report 
age 13 of 13 Case: CR-2006-0000107 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
User: COOPE 
state of Idaho vs. Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
ate 
'2312007 
Code 
NOTA 
User Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
Appealed To The Supreme Court G. Richard Bevan 
NIELSEN 
APSC 
ORDR 
N APD 
COOPE 
YOCHAM 
COOPE 
Order of Restitution G. Richard Bevan 
Notice And Order Appointing State Appellate G. Richard Bevan 
Public Defender In Direct Appeal 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal G. Richard Bevan CCOA 
SCDF 
SCDF 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Notice of Appeal G. Richard Bevan 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Filing of Clerk's G. Richard Bevan 
Certificate 
HATCH Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Cd Paid by: Mike G. Richard Bevan 
Wood Receipt number: 701 3386 Dated: 6/1/2007 
Amount: $6.00 (Cash) 
Notice and Agreement RE: Purchase of audio G. Richard Bevan 
recordings of district and magistrate court 
proceedings. 
NAAR HATCH 
Amended 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
G. Richard Bevan NOTA NIELSEN 
fax 
Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal G. Richard Bevan CCOA 
WAVE 
SCDF 
COOPE 
FERCH 
COOPE 
Waiver re return of property G. Richard Bevan 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Amended G. Richard Bevan 
Cierk's Certificate Filed 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Amended Notice G. Richard Bevan 
of Appeal Filed 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record G. Richard Bevan 
& Transcript Due Date Reset 
Proposed Order RE Return Of Property G. Richard Bevan 
SCDF COOPE 
SCDF COOPE 
ORDR YOCHAM 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney for 
Twin Falls County, Idaho 
425 Shoshone St. 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126 
(208)736-4020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, 
a.k.a. JUAN PINA, 
a.k.a. JUAN CARLOS PINA, 
a.k.a. CARLOS PINA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. C.R OG -107 
1 INDICTMENT 
1 
1 
1 
1 
) 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. JUAN CARLOS PINA, 
a.k.a. CARLOS PINA, is accused by the Grand Jury of Twin Falls County, by this indictment, as 
follows: 
INDICTMENT- 1 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER (FELONY MURDER) 
Felony, I.C. 18-4001,18-4003(d) 
That the Defendant, JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. JUAN 
CARLOS PINA, a.k.a. CARLOS PINA, is charged with the felony iuurder of Jesse Naranjo who 
was uiltawfully killed by a shotgun blast during a kidnapping initiated by JUAN CARLOS 
FUENTES-PINA, a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. JUAN CARLOS PINA a.1c.a. CARLOS PINA. 
That the Defendant, JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. JUAN 
CARLOS PINA, a.k.a. CARLOS PINA, on or about the 29th day of November 2005, in the 
County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho, did wilfully, unlawfully, and deliberately kidnap Jesse 
Naranjo by seizing andlor confining Jesse Naranjo with intent to cause him without authority of 
law to be kept andlor detained against his will and that during the course of that kidnapping, 
Jesse Naranjo, a human being, was unlawfully killed, to-wit: Jesse Naranjo was shot in the 
abdomen with a shotgun, from which he died, in violation of Idaho Code Section 18-4001, 18- 
4003(d). 
A TRUE BILL 
Presented in open court this 3rd d s 
/-'- 
0' 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
WITNESSES EXAMINED BY THE GRAND JURY 
INDICTMENT - 2 o 
.!. Ll 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina 
810 Washington St S 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
DL or SSN: 
-'"th Judicial District Court, State of 1.' 9 0  
In and For the County of Twin Fall, 
DlsTsiIcr coyf?T 
Fifth Jgdicial D!str!ct 
county Twtn Calls . State of Idaho 
.PT  
1 J A N  - 5 2011 $6 
1 4 
) BY 4 Clerk ) ~spu ty  Clerk 
) 
) 
) Case No: CR-2006-0000107 
) 
) ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
) 
1 
) 
) 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina, and it appearing to be a 
proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
231 4th Avenue North 
P.O. Box 126 
Y,  
Twin Falls, Id 83303-0126 
Public Defender for the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina, in all proceedings in the above 
entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that helshe may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appointed counsel. 
Copies to, 
: I L ~ u b l i c  Defender 
d ~ r o s e c u t o r  
Judge ' i .%.L ,t ,.:, ,PL. .,: .s $,>:j; ,t 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlC , F $ T T  C O ~ R T  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR -rHE COUNTY OF TwiN$~~t,lldlCial CiStlid 
c o u n ~  of Twin Fails . %ate of Idaho 
CASE# /'!!-,?h  -/o $' 
DATE 7-+-oh JAN - 5 2805 
TIME /: If;#&? 
CD /:,-?# ' BY 
\, . 
--- -,  , 
u e p u l p ~ l a ~  n 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ARRAIGNMENT [ ] STATUS [ I  CHANGE OF PLEA [ I  SENTENCING [ I  OTHER 
pDefendant is informed of the charges against himlher and all legal rights including the right to be represented by counsel 
[VDefendant advised of effect of guilty plea and maximum penalties 
[ p i e n d a n t  indicated heishe understands 
[ I  fiaived right to counsel @waived reading of information 
[ I  Court appointed Public Defender [ I  Confirmed [ I  Conflict [ I  Court denied Court appointed counsel 
$'ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY: Days for trial 
[ I  Set for Jury Trial [ j  Pretrial [ I  Status discovery deadline 
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA: [ I  Defendant duly sworn in and testified. 
[ I  Charge amended 
[ I  Enters plea freely & voluntarily with knowledge of consequence 
[ I  Plea of guilty accepted by Court [ I  Drug Court [ I  Sentencing date 
[ I  Pre-sentence investigation report ordered [ I  Updated [ I  Alcohol evai [ I  Controlled substance eval 
BAIL: [ I  Counsei addressed court. 
[ I  Released on own recognizance [ I  Bail set at [ j Court Compliance Program [ I  Bond condition order signed 
[ ]  Motion for bond reduction denied [ I  UA per week 
SENTENCE: [ ] Counsel gave recommendations to the court. 
[ I  Penitentiary Determinate Indeterminate [ I  Concurrent with - [I Consecutive to 
[ I  120 [ I  180 days retained jurisdiction [ I  Probalion time [ I  Withheid judgment 
Days discretionary Credit for days. [I- 
[ ]  Standard terms and conditions [ I  Probation fee 
[ I  Counseling services [ I  Drug rehabilitation rec. by probation officer [ I  Financial Counseling [ I  Report to aftercare provider 
[ I  Levei of Probation by probation officer [ I  No association wiindividual(s) 
[ I  County jail as term of probation - [ I  Suspended county jail [ I  Work Release if approved 
(1 Fine Fine suspended [ I  Court Costs [ I  Final payment due by 
[ I  Public Defender reimbursement iCR33D2 (Prosecutor fee) 
[ I  Restitution Amount Payments to begin at per month 
[ I  Apologize to victim [ I  No alcohol [ I  Not frequent bars [ I  No drugs(unless prescription) 
[ I  Substance abuse evaluation & follow recommendations [ ] Attend AA/NA x per [ ]  week [ I  month 
[ I  Job Search [ ]  Obtainimaintain fuiltime employment or student status [ I  GED to be completed by 
[ I  Poiygraph test [ j  Chemical tests [ I  Waive4th amendment rights to search 
[ ]  Driving privileges suspended [ I  Not possess flrearms(s) or weapon(s) 
[ I  Community service hours Within days [ I  Advise of address change 
[ I  Waive extradition [ I  Compiy with ail court orders [ ]  No further misdemeanors or feionies 
[ ] Enroli with Probation and Paroie reporter 5 days after returning to U.S. or 48 hours wln State of Idaho 
{ . " ,  .", 
,.. 
,..I ,. . . I  
.. .. 3 ,. .>.,. 
- ,. : , :;;:.+, F iAZ .,,adiu:<,:: ..J3.as,a .... . 
County of Twin Falls - Srate of idail+ 
JAN 1 2  2006 $;& PP 
8V 
~7 
, .,, +.....* ",,,-- 
Deputy c~L. , .  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR 06-107 
Plaintiff. ) 
Vs ) SCHEDULING ORDER 
) 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, j 
aka JUAN PINA, aka JUAN CARLOS ) 
PINA, aka CARLOS PINA, ) 
1 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John C. Hohnhorst, 
District Judge. Appearing was the above-named defendant with counsel, Marilyn 
Paul and Stan Holloway; Grant Loebs appeared on behalf of the State of Idaho. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the following dates shall govern 
trial of this case: 
1. Pretrial Motions must be filed within 28 days of arraignment and noticed 
for hearing on Law & Motion day within 14 days from filing. However, a 
motion pursuant to I.C.R. 22 must be filed within 20 days from the date of 
arraignment. The moving party shall also file a brief setting forth 1) the 
grounds for relief sought, 2) the factual basis supporting the motion, 3) the 
legal authority supporting the motion and 4) legal argument applying the law 
and facts. 
2. Pretrial discovery is to be completed 35 days prior to the trial date. The 
Prosecuting Attorney must review the law enforcement agency's file prior to 
the pre-trial conference to make sure all reports or evidence are disclosed to 
defense counsel. 
3. Expert testimony. All defense medical or expert testimony witnesses 
must be disclosed on or before the pre-trial date. If that expert prepares a 
. . 
written report, it must be given to opposing counsel prior tothe pre-trial date. 
4. Jury Instructions. Counsel must submit their proposed instructions to the 
Court ten days prior to the trial date. 
5. Exhibit and Witness lists must be filed 20 days prior to the trial to be used 
in preliminary jury instructions and to limit trial issues. 
6. Exhibits. Counsel will meet with the clerk to mark andlor to stipulate to 
exhibits at the pre-trial conference. 
NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRETRIAL IS ATTACHED 
Time calculations are governed by Idaho Criminal Rules. 
District Judge 
Alternate Judges: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned 
to this case intends to utilize the provisions of I.C.R. 25(a)(6). Notice is also 
given that if there are multiple defendants, any disqualification pursuant to 
I.C.R. 25(a)(l) is subject to a prior determination under I.C.R. 25(a)(3). The 
panel of alternate judges consists of the following judges who have 
otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan, Butler, Carlson, 
Elgee, Higer, Hohnhorst, Hurlbutt, Meehl and Wood. 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
(208)734-1155 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaiiitiff, 
VS. 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 
1 
) Case No. CR-06- 107 
> j STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION 
) OF TIME FOR FILING PRE- ) TIUAL MOTIONS, DISCOVERY 
Defendant. 
1 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney of record and the 
State of Idaho, and hereby stipulate and agree that the time to file the pre-trial motions 
addressed in the Court's 
the Court in the future, I\/\ 
Further, the parties agree and stipulate that the deadline for discovery cutoff 
and other ~ilotions such as those in I.C.R. 21, I.C.R. Rule 22 and I.C.R. Rule 25 be 
extended as well., Lk 'SL, 6'y 'w, m 6 ,  
This stipulatio~i s for the reasoil is that the above-entitled matter is one of great 
complexity. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this a day of 26@(p ,2006. 
Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS was 
delivered to Grant Loebs, Twin Falls County Prosecutor's office on the day of 
,2006. 
@J&~i'~f,.cauRT 
Fii.lh',~~~di~j~j ~ i g t ~ i ~ ~  
Counly of Tw~n I&IIS - sfate 
JAM 2 5  2006 4' ?f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I Q ~ H E  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWlKEKEXZ3---- 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-06-107 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for filing Pre-Trial Motions addressed 
in the Court's Schedulil~g Order and the Discovery cutoff and other motions such as those 
in I.C.R. Rule 21, I.C.R. Rule 22 and I.C.R. Rule 25, in the above entitled action are 
hereby extended. % buo t -La 
0-4- 
DATED This a5 day of ,2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the day o 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be 
parties and persons, by placing said copy in the appropriately marked n~ailboxlfolder, 
located in the Court Services Department of the Twin Falls County District Court in the 
Twin Falls County Courthouse, 427 Shoshone St. No., Twin Falls, ID: 
MARILYN B. PAUL 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
GRANT LOEBS 
PROSECUTOR 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
/ 
P. 0. Box 126 
11,  $ . -  Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126 1 - . 
(208)734-1155 'I.ERii 
1SB # 4444 - .._.__._l I~.,_.._ DEPUT'Y 
IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, W AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JUAN FUENTES-PWA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR 06-107 
MOTION FOR 
PREPARATION OF 
GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS AT 
COUNTY EXPENSE 
COMES NOW, the Defendant by and through his attorney, and hereby moves the Court 
pursuant to Rule 6.3 (b and c) of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, for an order 
requiring the reporter or reporters of the Grand Jury hearings, ally and all Grand Jury proceedings, 
including Grand Jury Impanelment, relating to events occurring on or about the 29"' day of 
November, 2005, held in the above-entitled case to prepare a transcript of said hearing at the cost 
and expense of tlie County of Twin Falls from the Justice Fund. 
This motion is made and based upon the records, files, and pleadings in the above-entitled 
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF 
GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS AT COUNTY EXPENSE -1- 
action and for the following reasons: 
1. That Defendant is entitled to Grand July transcripts pursuant to the above cited rule; 
2. That Defendant is indigent by virtue of the Defendant's representation by the Public 
Defender; 
3. The Grand Jury transcripts are necessary to aid the counsel in adequate lnotioll and trial 
preparation, and for purposes of hearings as provided for in Idaho Code section 2-213, 19-1001 to 
-1009 19-1 107, and 19-1601 to -1605 and Idaho Crilni~lal Rule 6.3 (b and c). 
DATED This d\lp day of January, 2006. 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF 
GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS AT COUNTY EXPENSE -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF GRAND JURY HEARING TRANSCRIPT AT COUNTY 
EXPENSE, was delivered on t h 2 h d a y  of January, 2006, to the following: 
GRANT LOEBS 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR 
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF 
GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS AT COUNTY EXPENSE -3- 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Tel: (208) 734-1 155 
t 3:.:>. tr, 1:; ,* ~,> , 
~1 s - r ~ ~ c ~ ? , , ~ ~ ; ~ j d ~ ~ , , ~ ,  
FII11.i Ju12jcial District 
Couniy of ?'lvin t i i l i a  - State of ldahr; 
I A N  3 1 2006 q@f'M 
BY 
Ckark 
Deputy Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, n\i AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR 06-107 
1 
VS. ) ORDERFOR 
) PREPARATION OF GRAND JURY 
JUAN FUENTES-PlNA, ) TRANSCRIPTS AT COUNTY EXPENSE 
1 
Defendant. 1 
This matter having come before the Court on application of Defendant for preparation of 
a typewritten transcript at the County's expense, and GOOD CAUSE appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a typewritten transcript of any and all Grand Jury 
proceedings, including Grand July Impanelment, relating to events occurring on or about the 29"' 
day of November, 2005 in the above-entitled matter, be prepared at the expense of the County, 
pm&$a&k 
from the Justice Fund, as soon as pszibb. 
DATED this ='day of January, 2006. 
ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
-29 delivered to the Twin Falls County Prosecutor's on the L d a y  of .&wary, 2006. 
GRANT LOEBS 
OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
MARILYN B. PAUL 
OFFICE OF THE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 and Deliver 
[ ] Courtl~ouse Mail 
d13and Deliver 
[ ] Courthouse Mail 
COURT REPORTER [.3<4and Deliver 
[ ] Courthouse 
ORDER 
1. j'";." "'"' 
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OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Telephone: (208)734-1155 
Idaho State Bar # 4444 
- 
IiV THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAI-10, 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR 06-1 07 
1 
v. 1 
1 WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 
1 
Defendant. 
1 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED DEFENDANT, hereby authorize my attorney, Marilyn B. Paul, 
Public Defender to waive my speedy trial rights and consent to continue in the above-entitled action. 
I have no way been coerced or forced into waiving said speedy trial rights nor have any 
promises been made to ine in consideration for such waiver, and I do not feel that I will be 
prejudiced if this were to occur. 
DATED this &day of February, 2006. 
WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL -1- 
Based upon the above authorization the undersigned, as coulisel for the above-named 
defendant does hereby waive speedy trial rights and consent to continue in this case. 
DATED this =day of February, 2006 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and conect copy of the foregoing 
WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL was delivered to the office of the Twin Falls County Prosecutor on 
the fi day of February, 2006. 
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13EPUTY 
IN TIHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIHE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO! 
Plaintiff, j Case No. CR 06-107 
v. 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, INDICTMENT AND 
1 MEMORANDUM 
Defendant. 1 
1 
COME NOW the Defendant by and through his attorney, Marilyn B. Paul and moves 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 6.7, for dis~nissal of the grand jury Indictment in the 
above-entitled matter. This  notion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that 
defendant's due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth A~nendmellts to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section Thirteen of the Idaho Constitution have been adversely 
affected. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Procedural Deficiencies 
The defendant asserts that there were deficiencies in the manner in which the grand jury 
was conducted, which did not have to do with the actual evidence present, but which, rather, 
related to the procedure and the ways in which guidance was given or not given to the grand jury, 
as set forth below. Prosecutors should refrain from attempting to influence the action of a grand 
jury or to give effect to the evidence that is adduced. Blake V. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 62, 14 P.2d 
240 (Okla., 1932). 
Combination of Grand Jury Proceedings 
The defendant challenges the fact that the state ran the grand jury on his case at the same 
time as cases on other persons with overlapping procedure, when there was no formal joinder. 
This "joinder" was defendant asserts, prejudicial to him as to the inclusioll of the co-defendant's 
matter, as the state in the comparative charging was clearly viewing defendant as " the bad guy". 
Even Inore puzzling is that defendant's grand jury proceedings were combined with proceedings 
on a totally unrelated case. Mass justice is antithetical to civilized notions of criminal justice. 
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Cl~alle~~ges to Grand Jury Selection 
The defendant offers challenges to grand jurors selected based on bias, but it is believed 
that all of the infornlation regarding selection of grand jurors for this case is not available at this 
time: therefore that issue is reserved for supplerne~ltal motions and briefing. In any event, 
defendant objects to the selection of a police officer to serve as a grand juror, where there was 
testimony in his case from a police officer witness, and to the selection of a nurse who practices 
in emergency medicine, where there was going to be testimony from a medical examiner. 
Defendant reserves the right to file challenges to grand jury impanelment and selection as more 
information becomes known. 
Objection to Use of Draft Indictment 
The defendant objects to the state's use of draft indictments in the presence of the grand 
jury, without consistelltly referring to them as a draft or proposed indictments. Instances where 
the term "indictment" is used in material such as the proposed indictments themselves or 
instruction material being read verbatim to the grand jury, or where it is clear that the documents 
themselves are not being referred to, are not included. Instances where the indictments were not 
referenced as proposed, prior to the return of indictment, were 64: 11,15, 66:23, Shores case, 
90:24, 91 :4,6,96:22, both Shores and Pina, 96:24 Pina, 97:1, Shores, 11 1:13 both, 126, 10.23 
Shores, 362:lO both, 365:17 Pina, 376:24 both, 377: 3, 17 both, 384 :12, both (but followed by 
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the words 'as they currently are'). The defendant coiltends that this is objectionably frequent 
use of the drdt i~ldictme~lts without reference to them as such, and that his case was prejudiced 
thereby. 
Objectioil to Use of the word "Charge" Regarding Draft Iildictme~lt 
The defendant objects to the use of the word, "charge" to describe the proposed 
indictments. This occurred at 1 1 1 : 1 1. The fact that these were referred to as charges implied 
that the decision had already been made by the state, and inviting the grand jury into the 
ackilowledged evil of being a "rubber stamp" for the state. (378:17-18). 
Sample of "No True Bill" Not Given to Grand Jury 
The defendant notes that the state used draft indictments, without providing a sample of a 
"no true bill" to the grand jury. It is noted by defendant that in the Ida110 Criminal J u y  
Inshxctions, verdict forms are set forth which make it simple to reflect the decision of a jury. 
Additionally, the verdict forms list "not guilty" as the first choice. The def. endant claims that by 
electing to provide proposed i~ldictme~lts to the grand jury, while not providing forms on which 
the grand jury could elect to not indict, the state is showing its preference for indict~ne~lt and 
making it more difficult for the grand jury to not indict. The state had obviously failed to clarify 
to the grand jury what the procedure was for reflecting a choice to not indict, (375:13 through 
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376:9), with questio~ls like, "Do we need a vote of 12 to not indict?". The defendant argues that 
by not tallciug in detail, even w11en asked, about how to not bring all indictment, and by not 
providing a sample of how to do that, the prosecutor was unfairly advantaged by using draft 
indictments, and impermissibly urging the graud jury toward fillding an iindictnlent. 
Improper Admission of Hearsay 
The existing case law in the State of Ida110 regarding the admissiou of hearsay evidence 
before grand juries is based largely upon former Ida110 Crimiiial Rule 6, which was rescinded in 
1994 and which is now found in I.C.R. Rules 6.1 through 6.9, and also based on Idaho Code 5 
19-1 105, which was amended in 1989. Both the rule and the statute have been anleilded to 
remove some of the wording relied upon in the al~plicable cases. Neither the present rules (1.C.R 
6.1 through 6.9) nor the present statute, LC. 19-1 105, provide specific guidance as to the 
admissibility of hearsay before a graud jury. 
The case law regarding the admission of hearsay before a grand jury is set forth in State v. 
Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230,743 P.2d 459 (1987). Edmouson holds that, "where legally sufficient 
evidence will sustain an indictmeut, inlproperly admitted hearsay evidence will ]lot overturn the 
indictment." In State v. Juhasz, 124 Idaho 851,865 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court held, 
citing the former I.C.R. Rule 6(f), that "only legal evidence, excluding hearsay or secondary 
evidence, can be received by the grand jury." The analysis of Edinonson (supra.), and Juhasz, 
(supra.), was adopted in State v. Martinez, 125 Ida110 445, 872 P.2d 708 (1994), to say, "[W)e 
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must determine whether, independent of any inadmissible evidence, the grand july received 
legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause." 
The defendant asserts that hearsay appeared many times in the testimony before the grand 
jury: Jacob Schmidt testifying that he heard statements from unidentifiable persons about what 
the purported victim was to be doing (144: 16-18; 147:24 through 148:15); a statement of "don't 
hit me" from an unidentified source (164:16); blatant hearsay concerning the witness' comment 
about knowing about a shotgun because of what the witness had read in the newspaper (174:9- 
10); and the testimony of Jacob Degarmo, referred to below, concerning statements that were 
supposedly made in Spanish, which Degarmo understands so little of that he relies on gestures 
and facial expressions (276:9-15). 
Of greatest concern to Pina, however, is the use of statements of the co-defendant, Jo lmy 
Shores, against Pina. This issue arose in the testimony of Detective Curtis Gambrel. Gambrel 
testified that Pina had made a statement to him, which is set forth at 34122 to 342:25. It is a 
very concise account of what Pina supposedly said to the detective. It appears that the only facts 
that Pina admits to that are in common with Shores' statement axe: (1) that a wrestling match 
took place, (2) that he heard a gunshot, and (3) that Pina left the house. Then Gambrel begins to 
testify about what Johnny Shores supposedly told him, starting at 344:21, and this account is too 
f~111 of references to things that Pina supposedly said or did to list in this instant brief. Gambrel 
was well into the account of what Shores had supposedly told him when the state belatedly 
interr~~pts (345:22 through 346:17) to point out that when Shores says soi~lething about what Pina 
does, that is hearsay and should not be considered against Pina. The rest of the testimony about 
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facilitate the presentatio~l dcompetent witnesses who can testify to matters within their personal 
knowledge that relate to the inquiry." The defendant coilteilds that the effect of this language is 
not only to prohibit inadmissible hearsay, but also to operate to exclude testimony that is 
speculation and not matters within t l ~ e  personal knowledge of the testifying witness. Dr. 
Groben's testimony, while also constituting hearsay, was also speculative in his response to a 
grand juror inquiry about distance for the i11,jury to have occurred (76: 16-1 7); Dr. Groben said 
that he is not a fireartns exanliner, but that (77:s-14), "I mean--in one of my books, there was a 
photograph that looked allnost exactly like that and that was about four feet ... so I would say that 
the, you know, that's a good approximation. Could it be a little more or a little less? Yes." 
A shocking amount of the testimony of Jacob Degamo (269 through 335) amounted to 
nothing more than speculation, since this witness testified repeatedly as to the content of 
conversations that he supposedly heard that were in Spanish. He claimed to uilderstaild a little 
bit of Spanish, but then admits that what he was relying on was facial gestures, expressions and 
body language (276:6-15). Following that admission about what he was really relying on, 
Degarlno was allowed to testify extensively as to purported statements of the instant defendant in 
ways that were very damaging to the defendant wit11 regard to the kidnapping aspect of the 
charge. For instance, he testified that Pina told the purported victim to get on his knees (276:23 
through 277 :3), but shortly thereafter acknowledged that Pina had been speaking in Spanish 
(278: 16-19). He referred to the "told him to get on his knees" statement again in response to a 
grand juror question (304: 17-25), and again at 3 10: 17-1 8. He testified as to statements of the 
purported victim, which were, seemingly, in Spanis11 (279: 11-19). Degarino testified repeatedly 
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as to tlie e~notional state of the purported victim, without being required to lay any basis in 
observation (279:16; 280:19-20 scared to go in the house because "he's [Pina] kind of pushing 
Jesse into the house"; where tlie asserfion of pushing, or any touching by Pina, was later retracted 
by Degarmo (295: 14 through 296:3); and more of tlie purported victim being scared to go in the 
house (295:2-10). 
The defendant asserts that the admission of this rank speculation behre the grand jury 
was vely unfairly prejudicial to him, and he was hal.med tllereby. 
Failure of the State to Instruct Regarding Lesser Included Offense 
The defendant asseifs that the state elected to try to instruct the grand jury regarding the 
applicable law, but failed to do so in complete form, and that by failing to instruct the grand jury 
completely as to the law, greater unfair prejudice was suffered by defendant than if the grand jury 
had not been instructed by the state at all. The grand jury was not instructed by the state as to auy 
lesser included offenses as to Pina. Trial Courts are obligated to instruct the jury on lesser 
ilicluded offenses if such are suppoifed by any reasonable view of the evidence, I.C. 19-2132(b), 
State v. Lopez 100/99,593//1003 (1979). While this was not a trial, defendant contends lesser 
included instructions should have been given. 
Lesser included offense instruction was given as to the co-defendant Shores. The 
proposed indictment as to Shores was for voluntary n~anslaughter, but the grand jury was also 
instructed by the state as to involuritary manslaughter (I l4:5-13), which is a lesser offense to 
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voluntary manslaughter. 
The state also elected to try to instruct as to some defenses to murder, justifiable homicide 
and excusable homicide. 118: 19 through 212: 5. This may have given the grand jurors the 
impression that these defenses were the "only way out" of the charge against Pina, since lesser 
charge statutes were not made known to the grand jurors by the state. 
Defendant asserts that due to the relationship of the alleged ltidnapping to the rest of the 
charge, the failure of the state to instruct the grand jury as to the lesser included offense of false 
imprisonment was highly and unfairly prejudicial to him. A grand juror questioned the 
prosecutor specifically about when the state believed the kidnapping to have taken place (364: 19- 
23). The prosecutor said, (365:18 to 366:19): 
"I mean, I'm happy to go over the law with you, although applying it to the facts is 
your job. 
ICidnapping is, kidnapping defined: Every person who wilfully seizes, confines, 
inveigles, which is to secretly smuggle away, or kidnaps, that's kind of cute the 
way they use kidnap to define kidnap, you know, but anyway, that's not much 
help, another, with intent to cause him, without authority of law to be secretly 
coi~fined or imprisoned within the state, or to be sent out of the state or in any way 
held to service or kept or detained against their will. 
I don't need, in the State of Idaho, 1 don't need to walk up to you with a gun and 
drag you from one place to another to kidnap you. It is possible that I could 
Itidnap this entire grand jury by locking the doors and never letting you leave 
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again." 
The juror responds with a comment, then the prosecutor goes on to say, ( "Even thougl~ 
you wallted in here. I don't know if you were happy to walk in here, but you wallted in here 
thinlting everything is fine). 
Now, the state of the law is that if you detain a person or keep them against their 
will, that that (sic.) can be kidnapping. Now, it's up to you to decide whether any 
ofthat happened here and, if it did, whether it rises to a level that, in your mind, is 
kidnapping." 
The prosecutor reads the proposed indictment for Pina, and then says the following: 
"Now, you can change the wording of that entirely. You can do anything you 
want to this docurnent. Unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, you can't do 
anything you want to the statute. The statute stays the sanae, the indictnzent 
changes to$t the facts of the statute, if need be." 367:9-14, (Emphasis added). 
The prosecutor did not, even during this very specific exchange about kidnapping, 
provide the grand jury with any information about false imprisonment being a lesser version of 
kidnapping. While it is true that individual statutes don't change, the message from the 
prosecutor to t l~e  grand jury was that that was all that the law had to say about circumsta1ces that 
could constitute either kidnapping or false imprisonment. 
Later another representative of the state said, " We present you with the facts and supply 
you with the law ..." 378: 18-19. A grand juror had earlier asked about why the word 
"kidnapping" appeared in the involuntary manslaughter definition. 132:25 tl~rougli 133 : 16. The 
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prosecutor's response was to say that the statute applied to non-kidnapping situations, but then 
went on to talk about other public offenses that were outside of the felony murder list. The 
prosecutor, however, did not talk at all about false imprisonment or any other type of non-felony 
murder type offense, such as aggravated assault or assault, that had any relation to the purported 
facts of the insta~~t case. It is noted that in speaking to the grand jurors earlier about involu~~tary 
manslaughter, the prosecutor had made it vely clear that maulslaugl~ter was being discussed solely 
as to Shores (1 13:20, 114: 15,22). 
After having read the proposed indictments and discussed the different levels of 
ma~~slaughter as to Shores, and read the defenses to murder, the prosecutor said (127:22-23), "I 
think that is all the law I'm going to read to you" 
The impression that the sum of this information must have made upon the grand jurors 
was that they were to consider the felony murder charge against Pina, based upon ltidnappii1g, 
and that the only choices that they had other than that first choice were to use either of the two 
defenses, or else not bring an indictment at all. 
Not only was there an absence of comnplete law for the grand jury to use, the state also 
provided illcomplete procedural guidance for constructing a lesser charge had the grand jurors 
come up with the idea of a lesser charge on their own. The prosecution at one point and at one 
point only advised the graud jurors that, ...[ I]f you believe that one or the other of these two men 
is improperly charged, either charged with too luuch or charged with not enough, then you have 
the authority to correct the indictmeilt, and we will do the paperwork for you. And you just need 
to lnalte sure that when you vote, you vote on what you want to vote 0x1, and ifi t  'S eitherfor os 
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against indichzent, you 're voting on the right question" 11 19-16 (Emphasis Added). Later in 
the preseiitation before the grand jury, they were told by tlie state (378: 17 through 3791, "You're 
not--a grand jury is not supposed to be a rubber stamp for our office. We present the facts to you 
and supply you with the law; and wit11 your determination of what you have heard o f  the 
evidence, ( fyou think that the proposed indictment is correct, then you can, then you can cigree 
with that, Ifyou thinlc that something's missing or there should be additional churges, you just 
let us know and we '11 do what it is you need us to do. " (Emphasis Added). No mention is made 
of how the grand jury is supposed to fashion a lesser charge; the message is that tlie state is there 
to help the grand jury add additional charges or facts to the proposed indicment. 
The state's attitude was further underscored by the following statement by the prosecutor, 
about the felony murder proposed indictment on Pina (3698-16): "...[Y]ou get to decide whether 
he goes to trial at all and, if so, on what, by changing this in any way that you, that you would 
like. So if you feel that the evidence showed this, change it. If you feel it--1 mean, keep it. If you 
feel it didn't, the11 change it to fit the evidence. If you feel the evidence is u~lcolivi~icing and you 
don't believe he did a~iything criminal in nature, then you would obviously want to reject fililig 
an indictment." The state offers at the end to write up "another option of an indictment", if that 
is what the grand jurors want (384: 11-20); Iiowever there is no advice to them that the option of 
lesser charges even exists, with regard to Pina. 
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Due Process Cl~allei~ges to Sufficiency of the Indictment 
I11 Idaho, the level of sufficiency of a grand jury indictment is set out in I.C. 5 19-1418. 
It requires in subsectioil six: "That the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and 
distinctly set forth in ordinary and coilcise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as 
to enable a persoil of corninoil understanding to know what is intended". 
The Defendant asserts that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90 S.Ct 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970), Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 31 1 (1999) and 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), present a 
challenge to Idaho's felony murder statutes. Defendant's Motion to Suppress or in the 
Alternative to Dismiss discusses this argument in more detail, but concisely put, the challenge is 
that Winship and Apprendi raise the bar on reasonable doubt to such a degree that a higher 
burden is placed upon the state as to facts wl~ich must be proved at trial beyond a reasona6le 
doubt. Winsl~ip (supra.) requires findings of reasoilable doubt to be made with "utmost 
certainty", and Apprendi (supra.) requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior coilviction, must be 
subnlitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The applicability of Appreildi to 
Idaho's law regarding felony murder is apparent, especially where Idaho has expanded the 
definition of "in the cornillissio~l of a crime" to include a "stream of events" concept. State v. 
Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1986). Defendant asserts that the higher tlxeshold of 
reasonable doubt set by these two cases necessarily impacts proceedings prior to trial, and the 
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level of due process notice that is required for a person to defend against these charges. The 
defendant contends that the facts the state inte~lds to rely upon at trial must be made lcnown to 
him as elements in the charging, as the facts clearly increase the nlaximum penalty for the 
otherwise proscribed conduct. 
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 31 1 (1999), hold 
specifically that the facts that increase the maximum penalty inust be charged in a11 indictment, as 
well as being submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The defendant asserts that the indictment in this matter fails to give adequate notice of 
the facts that the state intends to rely upon, and that such lack prejudices him in the exercise of 
his due process rights. 
Winship, Jones and Apprendi deal primarily with the need for these facts which increase 
the sentence to be heard by a jury, but their applicability to a charge of felony murder can easily 
be seen. Thus, defendant asserts that the grand jury indictment is insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Winship, Jones and Apprendi, and the indictinent should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant reserves the right to supplement this motion and n~e~norandun~ with issues 
and argument. The defendant requests that his objectiolls and arguments in this inotion be taken 
together to request disnlissal of the grand jury Indictnlent in the instant matter. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ,@I day of February, 2006. 
Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the midersigtled, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT AND MEMORANDUM to be properly delivered to the 
Prosecutor, on this 34, day of February, 2006. 
Grant Loebs 
Prosecutor 
Marilyn B. Paul 
Deputy Public Defender 
[ X 1 Court Folder 
[ X ] Court Folder 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No. CR-06-107 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
v. 1 AND MEMORANDUM 
1 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
1 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and througli his attorney, Marilyn B. Paul a id  hereby 
moves for the dismissal of the First Degree Feloliy Murder charge. This motion is based upon 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Alnendlnelrts to the United States Constitution, and 
Articles Six a id  Thirteeli of the Idaho Constitution. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
State Camlot Prove Kidnapping 
The defendant asserts that the charge should be dismissed, as the state cannot prove that a 
kidnapping occurred. The state's charge is based upon an assertion that a death occurred while 
defendant was in the co~nmission of one of several enumerated felony crimes, and that the 
enumerated crime was in this case, Itidnapping. The defendant argues that the evidence of the 
state is such that kidnapping cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that therefore the 
charge should be dismissed. 
Kidnapping as Charged Indistinguishable from False Imprisonment 
The defendant, Mr. Pina, contends that the subsection of Idaho Code $ 18-4501, 
Kidnapping, a felony, under which he is charged in this matter, is illdisti~lguishable in its 
elements fkom the elelnents of False Imprisonment, a misdemeanor, I.C. 18-2901. To "confining 
Jesse Naranjo with intent to cause him witl~out authority of law to be kept and/or detained against 
his will" (Indictment) sounds greatly like, "unlawf~dly violated the right of [name of victim] to 
come and go or to stay when or where [name of victim] wanted." ICJI 1233, FALSE 
IMPRISONMENT. It is noted that the language of the I~ldict~nent states "by seizing and/or 
confining", but it is noted that the lack of specificity of the finding oftbe grand jury arguably 
runs afoul of the requirements of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), as discussed below. Also, the grand jury in the ins ta~~t  matter could very 
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well have charged defendant with confining and not seizing. Obviously, if the offense that he 
was supposedly in the commission of fell outside of the short list of enumerated felonies that can 
support a felony murder, Pina could not be charged with Felony Murder. 
"The authority of tile legislature to define crimes and fix p~ulishinents ... is not denied 
unless the classifications are unnatural, arbitrary or unreasonable." State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 
278, 647 P.2d 734 (1982). The law must give sufficient warning so that persons may conduct 
themselves in such a way as to avoid what is forbidden. State v. Dolsby, 124 Idaho 291, 858 
P.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1993). 
A statute is unenforceable for vagueness if it " fails to give a person of ordinary 
intellige~lce fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute' and permits 
arbitraly or discriminatory enforcement." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585, 798 P.2d 43,44 
(1990) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,617,74 S.Ct. 808, 81 1, 98 L.Ed. 989, 
996 (1954)). (Citation(s) omitted). Althougl~ some ambiguity is unavoidable in the English 
language, a statute that is so ambiguous that persons "of co~nmon intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application" is unconstitutionally vague. Id. (Quoting 
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, * 125 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 
(1926)). See also State v. Leferink, 133 Ida110 780, 783,992 P.2d 775,778 (1999). (Citation(s) 
omitted). "The law must give sufficient warning that Inen may conduct themselves so as to avoid 
that wl~ich is forbidden." State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634,651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct.App. 1982). 
(Citation(s) omitted). It is also necessary that laws provide sufficient standards to those who will 
enforce them. Bitt, 118 Idaho at 585-86,798 P.2d at 44-45. (Citation omitted). " A vague law 
iilipcr~nissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
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application." Id. At 586, 798 P.2d at 45 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108-109,92 S.Ct. 2294,2298-2299,33 L.Ed.2d 222,227-228 (1972). See also Leferink, supra. 
(Citation(s) omitted. State v. Shearer, 136 Idaho 217,30 P.2d 995 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Substantive due process requires that state action depriving persons of life, liberty or 
property have a natural basis; the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that the 
judiciary will characterized it as arbitrary Pace v. Hymas 11 1 Idaho 581, 726 P.2dN693 (1986). 
The defendant asserts that because the eleillents are esseiltially identical between the two 
charges, that the arbitrariness and lack of due process iloticc iilherent in the coilfusion between 
the two charges, as well as the cruel and uilusual punishmei~t implication of this state of likeness 
between the two statutes requires dismissal. 
Due Process Argunlellts for Dismissal of Charge 
The defendant contends that his due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Aillendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Sections Six and 
Thilteen ofthe Idaho Constitution are violated by the failure of the state to articulate the facts 
upon wl~ich the degree of punishment for this purported feloily murder conduct is so dependent. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90 S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) sets forth that reasonable 
doubt must be fouild with "utmost certainty". Jones v. United States, 5426 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 
121 5, 143 L.Ed.2d 3 11 (1999), holds that due process at the federal and state level demands that 
any fact other than a prior coilviction that has the effect of iilcreasillg the maxiinuin peilalty for a 
criine inust be set foi-tll in ail iiildictment, submitted to a jury, and proveil beyond a reasoilable 
doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), ,holds 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
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that any fact which increases the possible penalty for a crime beyond the existing statutory 
maximum (other than a prior conviction), must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. While Apprendi dealt primarily with the difference 
between elements of an offense and "sentencing factors" that were actually disguised elements, 
and holding that elements must be found by a jury and not a judge, the analysis of Apprendi 
occurred in a context in which there could be a huge variance in the potential outcomes of the 
matter, depending on findings of particular factual circumstances. Apprendi says that 
preservation of due process rights depends on the means in which those factual findings is made, 
and, as well, t l~e  notice given to a criminal defendant, delineating these pivotal facts. 
Mr. Pina argues that ihe facts upon which the state chooses to rely to support a felony 
murder charge are of overwhelming significa~~ce, similar to the matters defined in Apprendi, 
because the variance of possible outcomes for the conduct is so huge, depending on the facts that 
a jury would potentially base its findings upon. The alleged conduct could, based upon unduly 
fine and minute distinctions in interpretations of the events, be charged as anything from false 
impriso~unent up to first degree murder In other words, the penalties for the conduct purportedly 
engaged in, in the instant matter, could range from a nlisdemeanor jail sentence to the death 
penalty, all depending on facts which prior to Apprendi (supra.), may not have been required to 
have been made known to a defendant in any degree of particularity. This would cause the 
punishmelit scheme of Idaho to be arbitrary and capricious, cruel and unusual punishmeiit, and 
violative of due process rights. While the felony murder scheme in Idaho requires that the 
findings be made by ajury, the Idaho scheme also contemplates that "in the co~nmission of [one 
of the enumerated crimes]" is the very broad concept of "stream of events". State v. Fetterly, 109 
Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1986) The defendant asserts that the felony murder scheme in Idaho 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
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is particularly violative of due process rights because of the adoption of the "strean1 of events" 
view of "in the commission" which f~~r ther  discourages the delineation of facts upon wl~ich the 
state relies in bringing the charge. 
Even well prior in time to the additional due process requirements specified by Winship 
(supra.), Balter (supra.), and Apprendi (supra.), there was deemed to be a due process issue with 
regard to felony murder in Idaho where the death penalty is being sought. State v. Windsor, 110 
Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985) discusses the additional specific findings in sucll cases made 
necessaiy by the United States Supreme Court holding in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 
S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). Obviously, even in the pre-Apprendi time frame, there was 
great discomfort with the idea of imposing the death penalty under a structure such as that 
offered for felony murder in Idaho. While the death penalty is not being sought in the instant 
matter, the due process concerns and prejudice to the defendant still exist. 
The defendant asserts that the felo~ly murder scheme in Idaho fails to comply wit11 due 
process requirements such as those articulated in Winship, Baker and Apprendi, and that the 
charge in the instant matter fails to provide sufficient due process notice. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant Mr. Pina asserts that the charge in the instant matter should be dismissed, 
for any and all of the foregoing reasons. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this a4, day of February, 2006. 
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public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM to be properly delivered to the Prosecutor, on 
this 2 4 day of February, 2006. 
Grant Loebs 
Prosecutor 
Marilyn B. Paul 
Deputy Public Defender 
[ X ] Court Folder 
[ X ] Court Folder 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T H ~ ~ , , , ~ ~ ' ' ~  : , ;  8 .: <!:. '." ': 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS a , .~ ,h  i.,!.), l,[;l;,,!..ic FiLEO 
",.. ,,!; . h"'? 7 " )  
,.,,... !,[:,;\c.[, ?$ 1 :  ,: 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CHARGES: 
[ I  CHANGE OF PLEA [ I  SENTENCING [ I  OTHER 
[ 1 Pros. ~ t t y  &L+ h& 
[ j  Other 
[ I  Defendant is informed of the charges against himiher and ail legai rights including the right to be represented by counsel 
[ I  Defendant advised of effect of guilty piea and maximum penalties 
[ I  Defendant indicated heishe understands 
[ I  Waived right to counsei [ I  Waived reading of information 
[ I  Court appointed Public Defender [ I  Confirmed [ I  Conflict [ ]  Court denied Court appointed counsel 
ENTRY OF NOT G~IL,~;B~~~~~~~~ Days for trial 
[ I  Set for Jury Trial [ I  Status discovery deadline 
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA: [ I  Defendant duly sworn in and testified. 
[ I  Charge amended 
[ I  Enters piea freeiy & voluntarily wlth knowledge of consequence 
[ I  Plea of guilty accepted by Court [ I  Drug Court [ I  Sentencing date 
[ ]  Pre-sentence investigation report ordered [ I  Updated [ I  Alcohol eval [ I  Controlled substance evai 
BAIL: I ]  Counsel addressed court. 
[ ]  Released on own recognizance [ ]  Baii set at [ I  Court Compliance Program [ I  Bond condition order signed 
[ ]  Motion for bond reduction denied [ I  UA per week 
SENTENCE: [ I  Counsel gave recommendations to the court. 
[ ]  Penitentiary Determinate Indeterminate [ I  Concurrent with - [ I  Consecutive to 
[ I  120 [ I  180 days retained jurisdiction [ I  Probation time [ I  Withheld judgment 
[ 1- Days discretionary Credit for days. 
[ I  Standard terms and conditions [ I  Probation fee 
[ I  Counseling sewices [ ]  Drug rehabilitation rec. by probation officer [ I  Financial Counseling [ j  Report to aftercare provider 
I ]  Level of Probation by probation officer [ j  No association w/individuai(s) 
[ I  County jail as term of probation [ I  Suspended county jail [ I  Work Release if approved 
[ I  Fine Fine suspended [ I  Court Costs [ I  Final payment due by 
[ ]  Public Defender reimbursement iCR33D2 (Prosecutor fee) 
[ I  Restitution Amount Payments to begin at per month 
[ ]  Apologize to victim [ I  No alcohol [ I  Not frequent bars [ I  No drugs(uniess prescription) 
[ j  Substance abuse evaluation &follow recommendations [ I  Attend ANNA x per [ I  week [ I  month 
[ I  Job Search [ I  Obtainimaintain fulltime employment or student status I ]  GED to be completed by 
[ j  Polygraph test [ I  Chemical tests [ J  Waive 4th amendment rights to search 
[ ] Driving priviieges suspended [ I  Not possess firearms(s) or weapon@) 
[ ] Community service ___ hours Within days [ I  Advise of address change 
[ I  Waive extradition [ I  Comply with ail court orders [ I  No further misdemeanors or felonies 
[ ]  Enroil with Probation and Paroie reporter 5 days after returning to U.S. or 48 hours wln State of Idaho 
IN.TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL Q I S ~ ~ C ? ~ O ~ , T J $ E  , 
r , :  / j .  
! .I 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OPITWIN FALLS 
- 
..., _ 
.^__, 
( ;.. , ., ,'rv 
' . , I  , STATE OF IDAI-10, 
Case No: CR-2006-0000107 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
1 ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES PINA, CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND 
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for an Arraignment on January 5, 2006, before the Honorable G. 
Richard Bevan, District Judge. The above-named defendant appeared with counsel, Marilyn 
Paul; the State of Idaho was represented by Grant Loebs, Prosecuting Attorney for Twin Falls 
County, Idaho. An oral request and stipulation for mutual discovery having been entered before 
this court, the compliance date for discovery is set on or before April 28,2006. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Discoverv: All parties will comply with the requirements of Rule 16, I.C.R., 
and use good faith and reasonable diligence in malting timely compliance with all 
discovery; if an extension is necessary, a written request will be made on or before 
the compliance date set in this Order. 
2. Motions: Defelldant is hereby ordered to file all pretrial motions governed by 
Rule12 of the Idaho Criminal Rules no later than 14 days after the complimce date set for 
discovely or otherwise show good cause, upon formal motion, why such time limits 
should be enlarged. All such motions must be brought on for hearing within fourteen (14) 
days after filing or forty-eight (48) hours before trial, whichever is earlier. All motions in 
limine shall be in writing and filed no later than five (5) days prior to the pretrial 
conference. 
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3. Alternate Judges: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to 
this case intends to utilize the provisions of I.C.R. 25(a)(6). Notice is given that if 
there are multiple defendants, any disqualification pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(l) is 
subject to prior determination under I.C.R. 25(a)(3). The panel of alternate judges 
consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this 
action: Judges Butler, Carlson, Elgee, Higer, Hohnhorst, Hurlbutt, Meehl, 
Melanson, and Wood. 
4. Status Conference: A Status Conference will be held on May 15, 2006 at 
-
8:30 am wherein the defendant(s) must be personally present in court. 
5. Pretrial Conference: A Pretrial Conference will be held on June 5, 2006 at 
8:15 am, wherein the defendant must be personally present in court. At this 
conference, each party shall: (A) provide the court with a completed exhibit list in 
the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, 
duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during 
trial; and (B) deliver to counsel for the other party a copy of the completed exhibit 
list and duplicate copy of that party's malted exhibits. Unless otherwise ordered, 
the State shall identify exhibits beginning with the number "I," and the defendant 
shall utilize exhibits beginning with the letter "A." Counsel for each party shall 
also deliver a written list of prospective witnesses to the court and counsel for all 
other parties at Pre-trial Conference. 
6. Exhibits: Counsel will meet with the clerk to mark andlor to stipulate to 
exhibits on the date of pretrial conference. 
7. Jury Instructions: Pursuant to Rule 30(a), I.C.R., each party is directed to file 
written requests for jury instructions no later than five (5) days prior to the pretrial 
conference. 
ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
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NOTICE OF TRIAL: 
Jury Trial is set for June 20,2006 at 9:00 am; 8 days are reserved for trial 
Tiine calculations are governed by Idaho Criminal Rules. 
G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
c: Grant Loebs 
Marilyn Paul 
Jury Cominissioner 
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EXHIBIT LIST 
, DISTRICT JUDGE CASE NO. 
, DEPUTY CLERK 
, COURT REPORTER DATE: 
CASE: VS. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
-
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR 2006-0107 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. ) ORDER R.E. 
1 BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES PINA, ) ORAL ARGUMENT 
1 
Defendant. 1 
This matter is before the court on the courts' own motion after discussion and stipulation 
of counsel. It is therefore hereby ORDEED as follows: 
Defendant's Opening Briefs due: April 7,2006 
0 State's Reply Brie@) due: April 21,2006 
* Oral Argument on Motions: April 27,2006 at 9:00 a.m. 
DATED this 30"' day of March, 2006. 
District Judge 
ORDER R.E. BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the a a y  of March, 2006, 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Grant Loebs fi) U.S. Mail 
Twin Falls County Prosecutor ( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
Y 
Marilyn Paul ( ) U.S. Mail 
Twin Falls County Public Defender ( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
Court Folder 
ORDER R.E. BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2 
"4/18/2006 21:34 2087341161 
- -- - --- --- - 
TFPUBLIC DEFENDER 
APR-18-2006 T L ~ E  pfl ;d PRNECUTING ATTY FAX NO, 7364'" 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
YroSC%l~tiIlg Atroiney 
flyr Twin Falls CO~inty 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208) 736x4020 
Fnx: (208) 736-4120 
) ..., . i-.., i 
.>I,; , ;ti;.,, <'.i-'!i"i; i! 
. ,  ,,,%, Q ?  > '3 i ,\,I\ , . LLA CO, li3AklO 
FILED 
I STATE OF IDAHO, ) CaseNo, CR 06-107 
1 
VS. ) STIPVLATION TO RESET 
) APRII. 27,2006, BEARIING TO 
JUAN CRRWS F U E ~ T E G  PRJA, ) APRIL 26,2006, AT 10:00 A.M. 
J 
~sfendabt. 1 
-.-. 
COME% ~ 0 ~ i C 3 r a n t  P.Loebs, Prnvecuting Attorney, md Marilyn Paul, Attorney For 
Wetfmht, and stipulate that the Hearing currently scheduled tbr April 27,2UO6, in th8 above 
oaptiond case should ke read to April 26,2004, at 1k00 a.m. 
ddy 6f Aprit 2006. htd &is 3 Dated this .&of April 20M. 
PAGE 03 
r. UL 
t P. Loebs 
Prosecuting Aitorn~y 
Stipulstian to Rsrct April 57,2006. t.leacing lo .kptil2&. 2006. at 10:00 a.m. - I 
DISTRICT COLIFX 
Fifth .ludicid Ointi'k;i 
C D U ! I ~  of Twin Fo!!s . St@:& r:l i,::oho 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Proseculing Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208) 736-4020 
Fax: (208) 736-4120 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR 06-107 
1 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 1 ORDER TO RESET APRIL 27,2006, 
1 HEARING TO APRIL 26,2006, AT 10:OO A.M. 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES PINA, ) and NOTICE OF HEARING 
Defendant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hearing currently scheduled for April 27,2006, in 
the above-entitled action be reset to April 26,2006, at 10:OO a.m. 
k District Judge 
Order to Rcset April 27,2006, Hearing to April 26,2006, at 10:OO a.m. and Notice of Heal-iilg 
,, . . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
1 hereby certify that on t h e a  day of April, 2006,I served a copy of the foregoing 
ORDER TO CONTINUE DISPOSITION HEARING and NOTICE OF HEARING thereof 
to the following: 
Grant P. Loebs 
Prosecuting Attorney 
[4 Court Folder 
Marilyn Paul p] Court Folder 
The Office of the Public Defender 
Attorney for Defendant 
Order to Reset April 27,2006, Hearing to April 26,2006, at 10:OO a.m. and Notice of Hearing 
CLERK 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208) 736-4020 
Fax: (208) 736-4120 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR 06-107 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 1 STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 
Defendant. ) 
The Twin FaUs County Prosecuting Attorney, Grant P. Loebs, objects to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss filed February 27, 2006. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is based on the 
followkiig three premises: 1) the State cannot prove kidnapping; 2) kidnapping as charged is 
indistinguishable from false imprisonment; and 3) due process arguments for dismissal of charge. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
Defendant's arguments in favor of dismissal are simidar to the issues in his Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment. Each of these issue as presented are unfounded and do not warrant dismissal, as 
shown below. 
The State Will Prove Kidnapping at Trial 
Defendant argues that the charge should be dismissed because the state cannot prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a kidnapping occurred. Beyond a reasonabIe doubt is not the 
standard of proof that the Grand Jury must determine. The state, in fact, intends to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt at trial that a kidnapping occui-red, which resulted in a felony musder. This is 
clearly an issue for the jury. Defendant gives no further factual or legal reasons for this argument. 
The Kidnapping in this Case is Distinguishable from False Imprisonment, 
and is Also a Question for the Jury 
Defendant argues that the elements of Kidnapping, I.C. § 18-4501, are indistinguishable 
from the elements of False Imprisonment, I.C. 8 18-2901. However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has reviewed both statutes and determined that while the crime of kidnapping embraces all the 
elements of false imprisonment, that the facts of the case determine which statute applies. State v. 
Evans, 72 Idaho 458,464,243 P.2d 975,978 (Idaho 1952). The individual facts ofthe case will 
determine the proper charge, and in this case, the facts clearly indicate that a kidnapping occurred, 
rather than the lesser charge of false imprisonment. The evidence in this case presented to the 
Grand Jury, in summary, shows that Defendant forced the victim into the house, and once in the 
house, Defendant forced the victim onto his knees at gunpoint, yelled at and threatened him, at 
which point a fight broke out involving a third party. The victim was killed during that fight. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
Defendant argues that the Indictment lacks specificity and is in violation of Appvendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Q. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). However, the Appvendi 
case discusses an issue that is entirely different than the issues as presented by Defendant in this 
case. In the Apprendi case, the defendant was charged with a crime that casried a possible prison 
term of 5 to I0 years. Id. The charge did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which if 
applied, could potentially have increased the sentence. Id. After the defendant pled guilty, the 
state filed a motion to enhance the sentence. Id. The judge, rather than the jury, found by a 
prepondei*ance of the evidence, that the crime was racially motivated, and sentenced defendant to 
12 years. Id., emphasis added. The defendant was not clearly informed of the full charge and 
possible sentence that could be imposed before pleading guilty. Further, in convicting the 
defendant of a hate crime at sentencing and increasing the sentence, the judge only made a finding 
of a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt. 
The fact pattern discussed in Apprendi is clearly not the case now before the court. The 
Grand Jury made a probable cause finding, stating the relevant facts and laws violated, giving 
adequate notice to Defendant of the charges that the State would pursue at trial. There are no 
surprise enhancements, and the State intends to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt at the jury 
trial stage. 
Defendant also argues that the Grand Jury could have charged Defendant with false 
imprisonment rather than kidnapping. However, the Grand Jury reviewed the evidence and 
determined that the facts justified a charge of kidnapping. If the Grand Jury had not been 
convinced that the evidence was sufficient to prove kidnapping, they would not have issued the 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
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Indictment. 
Nor is the kidnapping statute unconstitutionally vague, as alleged by Defendant. In 
detesmining the sufficiency of a statute against a vagueness challenge, words of the statute should 
not be evaluated in the abstract, but should be considered with reference to the particular conduct 
ofthe defendant. State v. Dolsby, 124 Idaho 271,274, 858 P.2d 810, 813 (Idaho App. 1993). 
The evidence considered by the Grand Jury, as shown in the transcript, indicates that Defendant 
forced the victim into the house. Once in the house, Defendant forced the victim onto his knees 
at gunpoint, yelled and threatened him, at which point a fight broke out involving a third party and 
the victim was killed. These facts led to the Grand Jury to find that the victim was kidnapped and 
murdered as a result of that felony. As the court found in Dolsby, in the context of this case and 
the facts, the statute of kidnapping better fits the facts than does false imprisonment, and the 
kidnapping and murder statutes, "give fair waming to a person of common intelligence that 
[Defendant's] conduct was forbidden and subject to the penalty of law." Id., at 275,8 14. 
The Grand Jury Indictment as issued is the proper charge, gives the required notice to 
Defendant of the charges against him, and gives Defendant the information he needs to determine 
his own plea. 
Defendant's Due Process Rights Were not Violated 
and do not Warrant Dismissal 
Whether an Indictment or Information conforms to the requirements of law is a question 
subject to free review. State v. Suminel: 139 Idaho 219,221,76 P.3rd 963,965 (Idaho 2003); 
citing State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1057, 772 P.2d 263, 264 (Ct.App.1989). The issue is 
whether the information in the Indictment is sufficient to fairly inform the defendant of the charges 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 4 
against him, whether it allows the defendant to intelligently plead, and whether an acquittal or 
conviction of the charges bass future prosecutions for the same offense. Id. The Indictment in 
this case, lawfully issued by the Grand Jury, states the following: 
That the Defendant, JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PWA, 
a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. JUAN CARLOS PINA, a.k.a. CARLOS 
PINA, is charged with the felony murder of Jesse Nasanjo who was 
unlawfully killed by a shotgun blast during a kidnapping initiated by 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. 
JUAN CARLOS PINA, a.k.a. CARLOS PINA. 
That the Defendant, JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, 
a.k.a. JUAN PINA, a.k.a. JUAN CARLOS PINA, a.k.a. CARLOS 
PINA, on or about the 29'h day of November 2005, in the County 
of Twin Falls, State of Idaho, did wilfully, unlawfully, and 
deliberately kidnap Jesse Naranjo with intent to cause him without 
authority of law to be kept &or detained against his will and that 
during the course of that kidnapping, Jesse Nasanjo, a human being, 
was unlawfully killed, to-wit: Jesse Naranjo was shot in the 
abdomen with a shotgun, from which he died, in violation of Idaho 
Code Section 18-4001, 18-4003(d). 
Idaho Code 5 4003(d) states that any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate kidnapping is murder of the fvst degree. Kidnapping is defined by Idaho Code § 18- 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
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4501(1), which states that every person who, "seizes, conhes, inveigles or kidnaps another, with 
intent to cause him, without authority of law, to be secretly confined or imprisoned within this 
state, or to be sent out of this state, or in any way held to service or kept or detained against his 
will," is guilty of kidnapping. 
The information provided in the Indictment states very clearly what the State is intending 
to prove at trial: that Defendant unlawfully kidnapped the victim, according to the definition 
under Idaho Code, and during that kidnapping the victim was unlawfully killed. The Indictment 
states the facts and the law which fairly inform Defendant of the charges against him, allows 
Defendant to intelligently plea, and is sufficient that an acquittal or conviction will bar future 
prosecutions for the same offense. 
Defendant argues that, "reasonable doubt must be found with utmost certainty." 
Defendant's Motion, page 4. However, the beyond reasonable doubt standard must be met to 
convict by a jury at trial. Reasonable doubt is not the standard of proof for a grand jury at the 
charging stage. As stated several times in this memorandum, the facts and law are adequately 
stated in the Indictment. There is nothing charged that would increase the penalty more than 
what is charged: Fist Degree Murder (Felony Murder). As shown above, this case is nothing 
like the Appvencti case discussed at length by Defendant. While Defendant believes that he could 
have been charged with something else, the Grand Jury found that it was more probable than not 
that he is guilty of felony murder by kidnapping. Defendant's arguments regarding the discomfort 
of cou~ts with the death penalty in felony murder cases is irrelevant to this case; the State has not 
asked for the death penalty for Defendant in this matter. However, the Courts have consistently 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
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upheld the validity of the felony murder statute. See State v. Fettevly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 
1202 (Idaho 1985); State v. Lanyord, 113 Idaho 688,747 P.2d 710 (Idaho 1987) State v. Eby, 
136 Idaho 534,37 P.3rd 625 (Idaho App. 2001). Defendant has not been denied due process, the 
felony murder statute is constitutional according to established case law, and the Indictment 
provides the due process notice necessary to Defendant to inform him of the facts and penalties of 
the charges. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is without merit. The State 
Objects to the Motion and requests that the Court dismiss the Motion it in its entirety. 
DATED this 21'' day of April, 2006. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ''" day of April, 2006, I caused a tiue and correct copy of 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM 
to be delivered to the following: 
/ 
Marilyn Paul Court Polder 
Twin Falls County Public Defender 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126 
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GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208) 736-4020 
Fax: (208) 736-4120 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR 06- 107 
Plaintiff, 
1 STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
VS. MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT 
) 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, ) 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney's Office by and tlxough its 
Attorney of Record, Grant P. Loebs, Prosecuting Attorney, and responds to the defendant's 
Motion fo Dismiss Indictment filed in the above-entitled case. 
In his Motion to Dismiss Indictment the defendant alleges a great many procedural 
irregularities in the Grand Jury process followed by the State. The State asserts that the 
irregularities alleged are eithernot improper, are de minimus, are speculative in nature, or did not 
occur at all. For simplicity, the order of the State's response will follow the defense brief. 
State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Disnziss Indictment - I 
Alleged Procedural Deficiencies 
The defense made no specific allegations of wrongdoing in this section other than to 
quote a position from an Oklahoma case which is unsupported in Idaho law. 
Combination of Grand Juni Proceedings 
The defendant complains that the State erred in holding the Grand Jury proceedings in the 
Pina case at the same time as the proceedings in the Shores case. There is no error in this, 
however, provided that the Grand Jury is instructed that they are different cases and that the 
Grand Jury must vote separately on each charge as it relates to each defendant. Further, this 
procedure was harmless. If the State had presented separate back-to-back cases where it called 
the same witnesses to testify first against Shores, then against Pina, the result would have been 
the same. 
There is no prohibition against the Grand Jury hearing cases against two defendants in the 
same presentation. In fact, under Rule 8, there would have been no impropriety if they were 
charged in the same indictment as well. Therefore, even if it was improper to hear the cases 
together (which it was not), there is no prejudice to the defendant in this case. 
The defendant provides no support for his contention that the State was viewing the 
defenda~lt as "the bad guy," and no source for this quote which does not appear in the transcript. 
The Grand Jury heard evidence related to proposed indictments against Pina and Shores 
for one killing, in which both Shores and Pina were involved. There was no combination with 
any "totally unrelated" case. The Grand Jury, in a separate matter, heard later in the day from a 
witness, Dr. Glen Groben, about another matter, but that hearing was not combined with the Pina 
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case. In fact, the Grand Jury recessed on the Pina matter to tale up Dr. Groben's testimony on 
the Nice case. 
While the State had originally planned to present both cases to the Grand Jury on that 
day, it became apparent that there would not be enough time to handle both cases in a single day. 
Therefore, the State called Dr. Groben only on the Nice case so as to avoid unnecessary travel for 
an out-of-town witness. There is no prohibition against the Grand Jury hearing more than one 
case in a single day; in fact, it is quite common. There was no "combination" of the cases. They 
were entirely separate. The defendant's reference to "mass justice" is bizarre. 
Challenges to Grand Jury Selection 
The defendant here only makes a general attack on the selection process. The only 
specific complaints are that a police officer and a nurse were allowed to serve on the Grand Jury. 
Clearly, there is no prohibition anywhere in law denying the right to serve on Grand Juries to 
police officers or nurses. Both of these jurors were questioned during the selection of the Grand 
Jury by both the Court and the State and stated they were able to serve without bias. They were 
passed for cause at that time by the Court and by the State. Further, both jurors were again 
questioned about their fitness to serve on this specific case at the time that this case was 
presented to the Grand Jury. Again, both were found fit to serve. 
In any case, this complaint does not fulfill the requirements of Idaho Court Rule 6.7 (b) 
and is, therefore, not a valid ground for a motion to dismiss. In order to succeed in dismissing an 
indictment based on a challenge to a Grand Juror, the defendant must show that with the 
"improper" Grand Jurors removed, the indictment would have failed. In this case, even if the 
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two Jurors complained about were removed, the indictment still would have issued by a vote of 
12-1. 
Obiection to Use of Draft Indictment 
The defendant's complaint that the State used draft indictments "without consistently 
referring to them as a draft or proposed indictments [sic]" is entirely without merit. The 
defendant points to ten places in a transcript of 397 pages where an officer of the State used the 
term "indictment" in discussing the proposed charges against Pina without immediately 
preceding that term with the word "proposed." The Court needs to examine each of those 
citations individually and in the context of the entire hearing (in which there are no fewer than 
two-dozen references to "proposed indictments") wherein the State repeatedly advised the Grand 
JUT of the fact that the drafts were proposed indictments which the Grand Jury had the power to 
modify in any way. The Grand Jurors were told that they needed to make sure the indictment 
they issued accurately reflected their view of the evidence, that they could add or subtract 
charges, defendants, and could modify the language in any way. 
In view of all the evidence, it is impossible to reasonably argue that the Grand Jury could 
have been in any doubt whatsoever that they controlled the content of the final indictment issued. 
Objection to Use of the Word "Charge" Regarding Draft Indictments 
For the reasons stated above, this allegation is meritless. 
Sample of "No True Bill" Not Given to the Grand Jury 
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There is no requirement anywhere in Idaho law that such a "sample" to be given. In any 
case, a "sample" of a "no true bill" would merely be another copy of the proposed indictment 
with the words "no true bill" written on it. There can be no reasonable argument that the Grand 
Jury was unaware of its authority to reject the indictment if they had been so inclined. The pages 
from the transcript cited by the defendant prove conclusively that they Grand Jury was instructed 
about how to "not bring an indictment." 
Improper Admission of Hearsay 
The State acknowledges that it is important to avoid the introduction of improper hearsay 
evidence into a Grand Jury proceeding. The State also recognizes the controlling guidance of 
State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230,743 P.2d 459 (1987) on this point: "where legally sufficient 
evidence will sustain a11 indictment, improperly admitted hearsay evidence will not overturn the 
indictment." 
This statement from Edmo~son shows two things, first, that despite the strong preference 
in Idaho law that "improper hearsay" not be admitted, the Edmonson Court recognizes that it 
occasioilally will be, and second, even ifit is it will not overturn the indictment if there is other 
"legally sufficient evidence" which will sustain the indictment. Clearly, in this case there is a 
large amount of "legally sufficient evidence" to sustain the indictment. There are several eye- 
witnesses to the crime, among other things. 
In any case, it is worth pointing out that allnost none of the defendant's examples of 
hearsay are actually even hearsay. The definition of hearsay is: "A statement other tha11 one 
made by the declarant while testifjiing at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth 
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of the matter asserted." (Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (c).) 
Using thaf definition of hearsay, let's examine some of the defendant's hearsay 
objections. 
-Page 144: 16-18, "...I heard, "Tell Jesse go to the back." And then someone else said, 
"Tell Jesse to leave."" This statement is clearly not hearsay. It is not offered to prove anything 
except that the witness heard this said. 
-Page 147: 24, "And I hear someone say, someone say, "Go have Jesse go to the back." 
Again, classic non hearsay. 
-Page 164: 16, "Then somebody said, "don't hit men?'This is a question from ajuror, 
not a statement from a witness, and, in any case, not hearsay. 
-Page 276:9-15, wherein the witness describes and interprets gestures made by the 
defendant, is not hearsay, under IRE 801 (d) (2) which specifies that statements made by the 
defendant may be used against him. 
In fact, of the instances of hearsay cited by the defendant, only one is in fact hearsay at 
all, and that is located at page 174, line 9-10 where the witness says, "Well, all I, I only knew he 
had to have a shotgun when I read it in the newspaper." This answer, however, was not solicited 
by a question from the State. (The question was "Do you know for a fact that he did not have a 
shotgun.") In any case, effect of the hearsay was immediately rectified by the next question from 
the State clarifjiing that the witness had no actual knowledge of any shotgun. 
The defendant also complains that the State improperly admitted hearsay evidence against 
him through Detective Gambrel's discussion of the confession of Johnny Shores. Quoting 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), the defendant correctly points out 
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that co-defendant confessions may not be used in trial against the defendant. What the defendant 
does not point out, though, is the reasoning behind the Bruton decision. The State is well aware 
of Bruton, but a Bruton challenge makes no sense with regard to a Grand Jury proceeding. 
Brulon is a confrontation clause case, and there is no right to confrontation at a Grand Jury 
proceeding.' There is certainly a potential Bruton issue if, at trial, Detective Gambrel relates the 
details of Johnny Shores's confession which relate to Pina and Shores is not vailable for cross- 
examination. But that issue is not yet ripe. 
Perhaps the defendant realized this and, therefore, included this quasi-Bruton argument in 
his section about hearsay. The real complaint about Detective Gambrel's testimony about 
Johnny Shores's confession is that it is hearsay. As such it should be analyzed under hearsay 
standards, not confrontation clause analysis. Detective Gambrel's testimony clearly contained 
some elements of hearsay. The State gave a cautionary instrnction to the Grand Jury that the 
evidence from Mr. Shores's statements to Detective Gambrel were to be used solely against Mr. 
Shores and were hearsay as to Mr. Pina. The warning given was timely and appropriate. The 
Jury Foreman accepted the State's instruction on that issue and promised to abide by it. 
The defendant's complaint that the Detective continued with his testimony and 
"completely ignores" the advice given by the State misses the point that this evidence was 
'Bruton v. Unitedstates, 391 U.S. 123,88 S.Ct. 1620,20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, 
the Supreme Court held that in a joint trial of two defendants named Evans and Bruton, at which 
Evans did not testify, admission into evidence of Evans' pre-trial confession which implicated 
Bruton constituted prejudicial error. The Court held that introduction of the confession added 
substantial weight to the prosecution's case in a form that was not subject to cross-examination, 
thereby violating Brnton's Sixth Amendment rights. Jury instructions given to limit application 
of the confession were held to be insufficient to protect Bruton's rights. 
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properly admitted, subject to the admonishment. The Detective's references to Pina are not 
improper, they are just not useable against Pina. There is no evidence that the Jury disregarded 
this instruction. In any case, the Jury received abundant evidence that justifies its indictment 
against the defendant. And, again under hearsay analysis, "where legally sufficient evidence will 
sustain an indictment, improperly admitted hearsay evidence will not overturn the indictment." 
Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230,743 P.2d 459 (1987). 
Improper Admission of Speculative Testimony 
The defendant claims that the State's witnesses engaged in a "significant amount of sheer 
speculation." This claim is without merit, and where there was speculation, it was either by an 
expert witness, or was harmless. 
Specifically, Dr. Groben's testimony was neither hearsay (as alleged) or improper 
speculation. As an expert witness he testified using books, documents, and other expert opinions 
which he relies upon as an expert in forensic pathology, as is allowed under the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. 
Jake Degarmo verbally described and interpreted, as a layman, gestures he saw the 
defendant make. This is not improper "speculation." This is an eye-witnesses explanation of 
what he saw. 
Failure of the State to Instruct Regarding Lesser Included Offenses 
The defendant contends that since a trial court must instruct a trial jury on lesser included 
offenses supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, the State should follow the same 
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practice in a Grand Jury proceeding. No Idaho case law, statute or rule is cited to support this 
proposition. That is because nowhere in the statute or rules governing Grand Jwy procedure is 
the State mandated to instruct the Grand Jury about lesser included offenses. 
In fact, the determination of whether a particular crime is an included offense of the crime 
charged is matter for a trial court to handle once the matter reaches that stage. In State v. Curtis, 
130 Idaho 522,523,944 P.2d 119, 120 (1997), the Supreme Court discussed lesser included 
offenses and Idaho Code Section 19-2312, which provides that the "jury may find the defendant 
guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is 
charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit the offense." Emphasis supplied. 
The jury which gets to deliberate about lesser included crimes is the trial jury, not the 
Grand Jury. And they only get to do that if the trial court instructs them. It is not automatic. 
Before the trial court instructs a jury on lesser included offenses, it needs to make a 
determination if it is appropriate. 
In Curtis, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth two theories under which a particular 
offense may be determined to be a lesser included offense. Only one of the two 
theories must be satisfied. 
Under the "statutory theory," a court will determine whether a crime is a lesser 
included offense by looking to the statute defining the crime and ascertaining if 
the matter argued as a lesser included offense is one that is necessarily included in 
that crime whicli is defined in the particular statute. Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524, 944 
P.2d at 121. For an offense to be an included offense under the statutory theory, it 
must be impossible to commit the greater offense without having committed the 
lesser offense. Id. 
Under the "pleading theory," a court will look to see if the complaint charges the 
accused with a crime the proof of which necessarily includes the proof of the acts 
which constitute the lesser included offense. Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524, 944 P.2d at 
121. Under the pleading theory, an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in 
the complaint as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense. Id. 
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State v. Mercer, 2006 Slip 32430, Emphasis supplied. 
Clearly, it is up to a trial court to undertake the determination of whether an offense is a 
lesser included offense, not the State at a Grand Jury hearing. The defendant argues that "there 
is no advice to them that the option of lesser charges even exists, with regard to Pina." 
Defindant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, page 13. This is not supported in the record. 
Responding to questions by a Grand Juror about what would happen to the charge during a jury 
trial, (Transcript, 368:21-25; 369: 17) the State informed them about lesser included offenses in 
the jury trial phase: "[the trial jury] can decide for or against the charge that they're presented 
with, and sometimes there are what are called lesser charges that they can consider, but they have 
to decide first on the main charge, and only if they decide to acquit on that charge, can they 
consider lesser charges." (Transcript, 369:25,370: 1-10). The Grand Jury was properly 
instructed as to the law. 
The standard of proof for a Grand Jury to find an Indictment is probable cause. It is the 
same standard used when police officers arrest an individual, and when a magistrate decides 
whether to have a defendant answer to felony charges in district court. At the time of arrest or 
bind over, police officers and magistrates are not required to consider possible lesser included 
offenses which may have also been committed by the defendant while he committed the greater 
offense. They review the evidence and decide whether they believe an offense has been 
committed and the person probably com~nittcd the offense. That was the task of the Grand Jury 
in this case as well. When this Grand Jury deliberated and indicted the defendant, they obviously 
concluded that the crime had been committed and that there was probable cause to believe that 
the defendant committed it. 
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Due Process Challenges to the Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The Grand Jury was repeatedly advised as to the standard of proof applicable to the Grand 
Jury's deliberations. Rule 6.6 was read in its entirely several times. The defendant's attempt to 
persuade the Court to go directly against Idaho law because the defendant believes that we should 
"raise the bar on reasonable doubt to such a degree that a higher burden is upon the state 
as to facts which must be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt" is both far-reaching and 
fanciful. 
The defendant claims to lack knowledge or to have not gotten notice of "facts that the 
state intends to rely upon." The State, quite frankly, does not even know what the defendant is 
talking about here. The indictment in this case was quite specific about what the State intends to 
prove the defendant did. 
Conclusion 
None of the arguments offered by the defendant in support of his motion to dismiss 
provides any grounds to support that remedy. His motion should be denied in all respects. In 
considering a motion to dismiss an indictment under I.C.R. 6.6 and LC. Section 19-1 107, the 
District Court sits as a reviewing court, and it is the Grand Jury that is the fact finder. In the 
Grand Jury proceeding, the District Court may set aside an indictment if, given the evidence 
before the Grand Jury, the court concludes that the probable cause is insufficient to lead a 
reasonable person to believe that the accused committed the crime. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 
477,482-83, 873 P.2d 122, 127-28 (1994). In the course of that determination, every legitimate 
inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the indictment. See 
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State v. Williams, 855 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Alaska App. 1993). 
Using these standards, the defendant's motions must be denied. 
DATED this 3 day of April 2006. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the t3/ day of April 2006, I served a copy of the foregoing 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT thereof 
into the mail slot for THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER located at the District 
Court Services Office and for delivery on the regular delivery route made every morning and 
afternoon to all Courthouse offices receiving mail from the Prosecutor's Office. 
Felony Case Assistant L' 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN m L S  
---_ 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CV CR-2006-0 107 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) ORDER CLARIFYING 
) TRIAL SCHEDULING AND 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, 1 PRETRIAL DEADLINES 
Defendant. 
1 
1 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on its own motion. In order to clarify the Court's scheduling 
order in this case, the followillg matters are set forth and HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. m: This case is set for a JURY TRIAL to begin at 9:00 a.m., June 20. 2006 in 
Courtroom No. 1, Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin Falls, Idaho. A total 
of &days have been resewed. On the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 
8:30 a.m. for a brief final pre-trial conference. Unless otherwise ordered proceedings will convene at 
9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at 5:00 p.m. each afternoon. The court will generally have a 
~norni~lg and afternooll recess, and a lunch break no less than one hour. In length 
2. JURY SELECTION AND VOIR DIRE. Counsel and the Court will meet inforinally 
no later tllan May 25,2006 to finalize tlie jury questionnaire. Jurors will be suln~notied to co~nplete the 
questionnaire on Thursday, June 1, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. Jury Selection will be conducted on a date 
determined by the Court and counsel after the juror questio~lnaires are completed. The Court's standard 
struck jury method will be utilized. The Court will conduct brief initial voir dire examination designed to 
confirm that all summoned jurors are qualified to serve, and cannot be disqualified for obvious bias. 
Thereafter, the State will voila dire the entire jury panel, followed by Defendant. Cllallenges for cause 
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may be made at any time while examining a prospective juror, but in no event later thau the co~~clusiotl of
questioning of the challenged juror. Pursuant to 24, each party shall have ten (10) peremptory 
challenges, plus two (2) additional preemptory cl~allenges for the additionallalter~iate jurors to be selected. 
Unless otherwise ordered, the parties will not be subject to any fixed or arbitrary time limit for voir dire, 
provided, however, that the Court may, in its discretion, limit or terminate voir dire which is excessive, 
repetitious, unreasonable, or argumentative. 
3. MOTIONS IN LIMINE. Motions i11 limiae are to be filed no later than May 19, 2006, 
and be heard no later than June 7,2006. 
4. SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. Hearings on ally lnotiotl in this case will typically 
be scheduled for a day other than a Monday, at a time convenient to the Court and counsel. 
5. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: The parties will exchange working copies of 
exhibit lists not less than seven (7) days prior to trial. Not later than Monday, June 19, each party shall: 
(A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) 
together with one complete, duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use 
during trial; and (B) deliver to counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and 
duplicate copy of that party's marked exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not i~lclude 
exhibits which will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless otherwise ordered, the State 
shall ideutify exhibits beginning with number "I," and the Defendarrt shall utilize exhibits beginning with 
number "1000." 
6 .  AUDIO-VISUAL AND OTHER EOUDPMENT. Cou~lsel are expected to notify the 
Court no later than the pretrial conference of any need for audio-visual or other special equipment. The 
Court provides a portable television and VHS-format VCR, a small x-ray viewer, an Elmo, easel and 
podium. Counsel may furnish aud utilize ally additional equipment but must tnalte all such equipment 
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available for use by opposing counsel. Counsel who furnish their own equipment should make 
appropriate arrangemellts to set it up in advauce so that prolonged delays are not required. 
7. JUROR OUESTIONS: Given the length of this trial, the Court will liot allow jurors to 
question the witnesses in this trial. 
8. TRIAL BRIEFS: The Court encourages (but does not require) tlle submission of trial 
briefs which address important substalltive or evidentiary issues each party expects to arise during trial. 
Ally trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged between the parties, and lodged with the Clerk (with copies 
to Chambers) at least ten (10) days prior to trial. 
@ r 
DATED this a d a y  of April, 2006. 
( District Judge 
ORDER CLARIFYING TRIAL SCHEDULING - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-C 
I hereby certify that on the A d a y  of April, 2006, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of tile foregoing, by tlie method indicated below, and addressed to tlie following: 
Grant Loebs ( ) U.S. Mail 
Twin Falls Cou~ity Prosecutor ( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed R) Court Folder 
Marily~~ Paul ( ) U.S. Mail 
Conflict Public Defender ( ) Iiand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
(IC) Court 
Jerry Wooley 
Jury Commissioner 
Virginia Bailey 
Court Reporter 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( ) Court Folder Ic 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( )Faxed &) Court Folder 
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EXJIBIT LIST 
, DISTRICT JUDGE CASE NO. 
, DEPUTY CLERK 
, COURT REPORTER DATE: 
CASE: VS. 
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NO DATE DESCRIPTION ID OFFD OBJ ADMIT 
Date: 6/26/2006 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
Time: 09:33 AM Minutes Report 
Page 2 of 8 Case: CR-2006-0000107 
Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
Selected Items 
User: BARTLETT 
Hearing type: Motion 
Assigned judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Minutes clerk: Teresa Yocham 
Minutes date: 04/26/2006 
Start time: 10:24 AM , 
End time: 10:24 AM 
Audio tape number: 
Prosecutor: Grant Loebs 
Defense attorney: Marilyn Paul 
Tape Counter: 1021 Court addressed Counsel. This is the time for the motion to dismiss the indictment and 
motion to set aside the indictment. 
Tape Counter: 1023 Ms. Paul gave argument on the motions. 
Tape Counter: 1036 Court addressed Ms. Paul. Ms. Paul responded. 
Tape Counter: 1049 Mr. Loebs gave argument. 
Tape Counter: 11 07 Ms. Paul gave final argument on the motions. 
Tape Counter: 11 13 Court thanked Counsel. Court will take this matter under advisement. 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208) 736-4020 
Fax: (208) 736-4120 
BY --. 
CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR 06- 107 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
) 
ORDER TO EXTEND 
) DISCOVERY DEADLINE 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, ) 
Defendant. 
1 
1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the discovery deadline referenced in this Court's Order 
Governing Further Criminal Proceedings and Notice of Trial Setting shall be extended to May 
12,2006. + 
DATED this 2 $ a a y  of April 2006 o&,q G. Richard Bevan 
District Judge 
Order to Extend Discovery Deadline 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the &day of ApsilZW6, I served a copy of the foregoing 
ORDER TO EXTEND DISCOVERY DEADLINE thereof to the following: 
Grant P. Loebs 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Marilyn Paul [ Court Folder 
Attorney for Defendant 
Order to Extend Discovery Deadline 
n4/ d w d n n b  u2: n4 Ann / J 4 l l b l  
" - 
- 1FPUBLIC DEFENDER PAGE 02 
APR-20-2000 FRI 01 r58 , rF CO PROSECUTING RTTY I.bX NU1 7' "120 P, 01 
a m  P. LoEBS 
Prosecuthg Attorney 
for Twin Falls COMty 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, 3D 83303 
Phone: (208) 7364020 
Fax: (208) 736.4120 
IN TNF, DBTRICT C O W  OF THE F W  W I C N  DISTNCT OF T.W STATE 
OF IDAH4 lN AND FOR THB C O W  OF T W H  PALS 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR 06-107 
f 
Plaintiff, ) 
~ $ 4 .  j s ~ m ~ n o r r  TO  END 
) RISCOVERY D E A D L N  
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, ) 
Defendant. ) 
d
COMB NOW Chnt P' Loebs, Prosemtiing AClMney, wand Marilyn Paul, Attomw for 
Dekdant, and stipulate that rhe Discovmy Deadline ~m&y set for April 28,2004 shauld be 
extended to May 12,2006. 
Orant P' La&a 
Prosecuting Attorney 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208)736-4020 
Fax: (208)736-4120 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR 06-1 07 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. ) STATE'S WITNESS LIST 
) 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, ) 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW The Plaintiff, Grant P. Loebs, Prosecuting Attor~ley for Twin Falls 
County, State of Idaho, and subsnits the followillg list of potential witnesses in the above-entitled 
matter: 
1. Shirlene Aguirre. 
2. Lucas Allen. 
3. Steve Beslkula. 
4. Mynde Bolton. 
5. Daniel Clements. 
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Mike Covington. 
Chris Fulliner. 
Curtis Gambrel. 
Matt EIicks. 
Justin Hendricltson. 
Ryan I-Towe. 
Lynn Jaynes. 
Bryan Krear. 
Joan Lang. 
Dan Lewin. 
Mark Marvin. 
Jiin Massey. 
Dan McAtee. 
Chuck Miller. 
Arnold Morgado. 
Jim Mum. 
Tracy Perreira. 
Brian Pike. 
Dennis Pullin. 
Patti Rohweder. 
Eric Steele. 
Craig Stotts. 
Matt Triner. 
STATE'S WITNESS LIST - 2 
Wendy Walter. 
David Weigt. 
John Wilson. 
Chad Wigington. 
Michelle Wyatt. 
Clvis Schenk. 
Dan Tl~ornton. 
Scott Ward. 
Dennis Chambers. 
Tamny Gray. 
Glen Groben. 
Doug Tucker. 
Don Frickey. 
Gary John. 
Jennifer Vera. 
Cliff Johnson. 
Stephanie Shaffer. 
Alan Layton. 
Derek Walker. 
Dave Allred. 
Kevin Rosenau. 
Shanon Bales. 
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Zippy Duel. 
Cherrell Jacobson. 
Michael Wright. 
MVRMC Ambulance Personnel, some na~nes unknown at this time 
MVRMC Emergency Department Medical Persolmel, some names uilknowli at 
this time. 
Bob (last name uh lowi~) .  
Trish (last name unknown). 
Danielle Cain. 
Jesse Castillo. 
Jose Castillo. 
Joseph Codner. 
Jacob DeGanno. 
Don Eickley. 
Amanda Evans. 
Cesar Flores-Moreno. 
Debbie Heck. 
William Troy Hedgecock, 
Cynthia Hembree. 
Norma I-Ieimandez. 
Ryan Jay. 
Amy Jeilkins. 
STATE'S WITNESS LIST - 4 
Angela Johnson. 
Ashley Jolmson. 
ICulm Leatha. 
Bart Livingston. 
Amber Marston. 
ICimnber Marston. 
LaDawna Marston. 
Richard Martin. 
Jay Martindale. 
Theresa Martindale. 
Art Martinez. 
Danny Morgan. 
Bertha Naranjo. 
Eugene Naranjo. 
Janes Naranjo. 
Jason Naumann. 
Robert Parsons. 
Clvistina Pierre. 
Jolm Pierre. 
Graciela Pina. 
Shanel Pruitt. 
Jon Reilly. 
Jeremiah Schmidt. 
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96. Lisa Schmidt. 
97. Rocky Schmidt. 
98. Dawn Shores. 
99. Johnny Shores. 
100. Jennifer Smallwood. 
101. Connie Walker. 
102. Philip Warren. 
103. Wendy Warren. 
104. Susan Watson. 
105. Terry Watson. 
The State has also provided to defense counsel a separate document containing contact 
infornlation for the above-listed witnesses. 
DATED This day of May 2006. 
Grant P. Loebs 
Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
---P- 
I hereby certify that on the a day of May 2006,I served a copy of the foregoing 
STATE'S WITNESS LIST thereof into the illail slot for THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER located at tlie District Court Services Office and for delivery on the regular 
delivery route made every nrtorning and afternoon to all Courthouse offices receiving inail from 
the Prosecutor's Office. 
Stacey ~hler/ 
 elo on) case' Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlTH JUDICIAL DISTRlGmiQFi$H,G u!?, I D ~ I ~ O  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLSFILEO 
[ I  CHANGE OF PLEA [ I  SENTENCING [ I  OTHER 
[ 1 Pros. ~ t t y  k&++t A P ~ A  [ I  Other 
PROCEEDINGS AND ADVI~EMENT OF RIGHTS: 
[ ]  Defendant is informed of the charges against himlher and all legal rights including the right to be represented by counsel 
[ I  Defendant advised of effect of guilty plea and maximum penalties 
[ I  Defendant indicated helshe understands 
[ ]  Waived right to counsel [ I  Waived reading of information 
[ I  Court appointed Public Defender [ I  Confirmed [ ]  Conflict [ I  Court denied Court appointed counsel 
ENTRY OF NOT GUIL1Y: Days for trial 
[ I  Set for Jury Trial [ I  Pretrial [ I  Status discovery deadline 
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA: [ I  Defendant duly sworn in and testified. 
[ I  Charge amended 
[ ]  Enters plea freeiy & voluntarily ~ 4 t h  knowledge of consequence 
[ I  Plea of guilty accepted by Court [ I  Drug Court [ I  Sentencing date 
[ I  Pre-sentence investigation report ordered [ I  Updated [ I  Alcohol eval [ I  Controlled substance eval 
BAIL: [ I  Counsel addressed court. 
[ 1 Released on own recognizance [ I  Bail set at [ I  Court Compliance Program [ I  Bond condition order signed 
[ I  Motion for bond reduction denied [ I  UA per week 
SENTENCE: [ I  Counsel gave recommendations to the court. 
[ I  Penitentiary Determinate Indeterminate [ I  Concurrent with - [ I  Consecutive to 
[ I  120 [ I  180 days retained jurisdiction [ I  Probation time [ I  Withheld judgment 
[ 1- Days discretionary Credit for days. 
[ I  Standard terms and conditions [ I  Probation fee 
[ ] Counseling services [ I  Drug rehabilitation rec. by probation officer [ I  Financial Counseiing [ ]  Report to aftercare provider 
[ I  Level of Probation by probation officer [ I  No association wlindividual(s) 
[ I  County jail as term of probation [ I  Suspended county jali I ]  Work Release if approved 
[ I  Fine Fine suspended [ I  Court Costs [ I  Final payment due by 
[ I  Public Defender reimbursement ICR33D2 (Prosecutor fee) 
[ I  Restitution Amount Payments to begin at per month 
[ I  Apologize to victim [ I  No alcohol [ I  Not frequent bars [ I  No drugs(unless prescription) 
[ ]  Substance abuse evaluation & foilow recommendations [ I  Attend AAlNA x per [ I  week [ I  month 
[ I  Job Search [ I  Obtainlmaintain fulltime employment or student status [ I  GED to be completed by 
[ j Polygraph test [ I  Chemical tests [ I  Waive 4th amendment rights to search 
[ ]  Driving privileges suspended [ ] Not possess firearms(s) or weapon(s) 
[ 1 Community service hours Within days [ ] Advise of address change 
[ I  Waive extradition [ I  Comply with all court orders [ I  No further misdemeanors or felonies 
[ ]  Enroil with Probation and Parole reporter 5 days after returning to U.S. or 48 hours wln State of Idaho 
1 1 1 . 
IC VAI, 
L MEDICAL C 
P.O. BOX 409 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0409 
RECIEPT OF MEDICAL RECORDS , 
CASE # - - 
I HAVE RECOEVED RECORDS ON-Tn - -. PREPARED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH SUBPEONAfCOURT 
RECORDS COPIED AND DELIVERED TO THE CLERK OF 
Mil-. RECIEVED B 
HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
MAGIC VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
TWIN FALLS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. BOX 126 
TWIN FALLS. ID 83303-0126 
Telephone: (208) 734-1 155 
ISB # 4444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, 5 Case No. CR 06-107 
VS. 
1 
1 MOTION IN LIMINE 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 
1 
1 
Defendant. 
1 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through counsel, Marilyn B. Paul, and 
hereby moves for the exclusion of evidence as follows: 
1. Mr. Pina moves for the exclusion of the State's purported evidence 
regarding a footprint on the door referenced in D 578, D 592, D 596 and 
elsewhere in the State's discovery. The reason for the motion is that 
defendant asserts that that evidence would be irrelevant under Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 401 and 402, and further that it would be unfairly prejudicial 
and would tend to confuse the jury under I.R.E. Rule 403. Further, Mr. Pina 
challenges such proposed evidence upon foundational grounds and grounds 
of lack of scientific admissibility. 
2. Mr. Pina also challenges the admissibility of the matters listed as "Call 
Detail Records" found at D 436 through D 442 in the States response to 
MOTION IN LIMINE -1- i .1 3 
discovery. Such record appears to have been possibly generated as a result 
.. 
, 
. . . ; , ,,. , i  of apen register, which would require a warrant. No copy of a warrant was 
provided in discovery. A warrant for a pen register would be required under 
Idaho Code 5 18-671 9 et seq.. 
The defendant requests exclusioil of the above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &day of May, 2006. 
M O T I O N  I N  L I M I N E  -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE was delivered to the office of the Twin Falls County 
Prosecuting Attorney on the I? day of h 
GRANT LOEBS 
* 2o06, 
[ d u r t h o u s e  Mail 
Twin Falls County 
Prosecutil~g Attorney [ 1 Fax 
MOTION IN LIMINE -3- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-06-0107 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS. ) AND ORDER R.E. 
1 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
JUAN FUENTES-PIRA, ) DISMISS INDICTMENT ON 
1 LEGAL GROUNDS 
Defendant. 1 
\ 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First 
Degree Felony Murder charge against him. Ms. Marilyn Paul represented the 
Defendant, Juan Fuentes-Piiia. Mr. Grant Loebs, Twin Falls Prosecuting 
Attorney, appeared on behalf of the State. After reviewing the materials 
submitted by both parties, researching the applicable law, and hearing oral 
argument, the motion to dismiss the First Degree Felony Murder charge is 
denied. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 1 
AND ORDER 
Statement of the Case and Procedural History 
A Bill of Indictment was presented by a Twin Falls County Grand Jury on 
January 03,2006, charging Juan Carlos Fuentes-Pifia ("Defendant") with the 
felony murder of Jesse Naranjo. In the indictment, the state alleges that on or 
about November 29,2005, the Defendant kidnapped Jesse Naranjo in violation of 
Idaho Code 9 18-4501. In the course of the alleged kidnapping, Mr. Naranjo was 
shot in the abdomen and subsequently died, in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-4001 
and 9 18-4003(d). After a bill in favor of indictment was returned by the Grand 
Jury, the Defendant was brought into custody, charged with First Degree Murder 
and accordingly arraigned. Also at this time, an eight-day jury trial was set, to 
commence on June 20,2006. 
On April 7,2006, Defendant, through his Counsel, filed two motions, a 
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and a Motion to Dismiss the First Degree 
Felony Murder charge. Oral arguments were heard on April 26,2006, at which 
the Defendant and the State both argued their positions. 
Standard of Review 
The coi~stitutionality of statutes presents a question of law. State v. Cobb, 
132 Idaho 195,196, 969 P.2d 244, 245 (1998); City o f s u n  Valley v. S u n  Valley Co., 
128 Idaho 219,912 P.2d 106 (1996). The party challenging a statute on 
constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute is 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 2 
AND ORDER 
unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." Olsen v. 
J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,709,791 P.2d 1285,1288 (1990). A statute should 
not be held void for vagueness if any practical interpretation can be given it. City 
of Lewiston v. Matlzewson, 78 Idaho 347,303 P.2d 680 (1956). 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This doctrine requires 
that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
that the statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriininatory enforcement. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126,131 
(2003) (citing Village o f H o f m a n  Estates v. Flipside, Hoffinan Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489,102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment 
is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of 
RoclJord, 408 U.S. 104,92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972). Furthermore, as a matter of due 
process, no one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131 
(citing United States v. Smitlz, 795 F.2d 841,847 n. 4 (9th Cir.1986), citing Lanzelta 
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453, 59 S.Ct. 618,619 (1939)). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 3 
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The standard for reviewing a statute claimed to be void for vagueness has 
been stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals as follows: 
Due process requires that a statute defining a crime be 
sufficiently explicit so all persons may know what conduct will 
subject them to penalties. It is settled that this 'fair warning' 
requirement prohibits the various states from holding an 
individual criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed. The law must give 
sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid 
that which is forbidden. 
In determining the sufficiency of a statute, the words of the 
questioned statute should not be evaluated in the abstract but 
should be considered with reference to the particular conduct of the 
defendant. The principle consistently followed, in cases where a 
criminal statute is challenged as void for vagueness, is that 'a 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
essential of due process of law.' 
State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634, 651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct.App.1982) (citations 
omitted). 
DISCUSSION 
A. Statutory Analysis. 
The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the 
burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a 
strong presumption of validity." Olsen v. ].A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 
P.2d 1285,1288 (1990). When an appellate court considers a claim that a statute is 
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unconstitutional, "there is a strong presumption of the validity of the statute, City 
of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347,303 P.2d 680 (1956), and an appellate court 
is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its 
constitutionality." In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho 157,159,106 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2005). 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection 
against being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58,63,14 P.3d 378,383 (Ct. App. 2000). 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as 
applied to a defendant's conduct. For a "facial vagueness" challenge to be 
successful, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications." Village of HoljFnzan Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 
S.Ct. 1186,1193 (1982). In other words, the challenger must show that the 
enactment is entirely invalid. 
To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must 
show that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair 
notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether 
to arrest him. A "facial vagueness" analysis is mutually exclusive from an "as 
applied" analysis. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711,69 P.3d at 131 (citing 
Sclzwarhmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir.l984)), 
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i. The kidnapping statute is valid on its 
face. 
As previously stated, in a facial challenge of a statute, "the challenger 
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct 2095, 2100 (1987). 
Certainly, Idaho's kidnapping statute can be constitutionally applied. 
In order for an individual to be guilty of kidnapping under Idaho Code 5 
18-4501, it must be shown that he or she "willfully: seizes, confines, inveigles or 
kidnaps another, with intent to cause him, without authority of law, to be 
secretly confined or imprisoned within this state, or to be sent out of this state, or 
in any way held to service or kept or detained against his will." 
These elements can and have been established in a myriad of ways and in 
a variety of applications in Idaho's jurisprudence. Reported cases establish that 
Idaho's courts have applied the kidnapping statute to specific facts and 
circumstances, and the statute is clearly not so vague as to specify "no set of 
circumstances . . . under which the Act would be valid." See, e.g., State  v. Evans, 
72 Idaho 458,243 P.2d 975 (1952); State v. Horn,  101 Idaho 192,610 P.2d 551 
(1980); and State v .  Rrledge, 119 Idaho 584,808 P.2d 1329 (Ct.App.1991). 
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ii. The kidnapping statute is not 
unconstitutional as applied to the 
Defendant. 
In actuality, the Defendant can only argue that the kidnapping statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to him and his conduct. However, the court 
disagrees and concludes that the evidence before the grand jury supports its 
finding, and the statute was appropriately "applied" to Mr. Pifia in this case. 
The argument that the defendant committed some crime other than 
kidnapping does not create ambiguity or otherwise male the lcidnapping statute 
void for vagueness as applied to Mr. Pifia. Certainly, the defendant's conduct, as 
viewed in the State's favor, supports a charge of kidnapping as opposed to a 
charge of false imprisonment. 
The elements of kidnapping are distinguishable from the elements of false 
imprisonment. See State v. Evans, 72 Idaho 458,243 P.2d 975 (1952) (although the 
crime of kidnapping embraces each element of the crime of false imprisonment, 
each case is fact-specific such that in some cases kidnapping is the appropriate 
crime and in others, false imprisonment is the appropriate crime). The bottom 
line is that the kidnapping statute, as applied to Mr. Piiia, clearly prohibits the 
conduct of which he is accused in this case. 
Here, the court finds no justifiable reason why the First Degree Felony 
Murder Charge should be dismissed. The kidnapping statute was legally 
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applied to the facts of this case by the grand jury and the Defendant will 
therefore be required to stand trial on the charges alleged against hiin. 
B. Due Process Claim. 
I. The State has articulated sufficient facts 
and the Indictment gives the Defendant 
adequate notice of the specific charge 
against him. 
The Defendant argues that the State has not articulated specific facts to 
support the Indictment. However, the record before the court does not support 
this claim. The Indictment gives the defendant ample notice of the charges 
against him, as articulated in the court's companion decision and order, issued 
on this date and incorporated herein by this reference. 
Due Process requires that a statute defining a crime be sufficiently explicit 
so all persons may know what conduct on their part will subject them to its 
potential penalties. It is settled that this "fair warning" requirement prohibits the 
various States from holding an individual criminally responsible for conduct 
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. The law must give 
sufficient warning that persons may conduct thc~nselves o as to avoid that 
which is forbidden. 
In determining the sufficiency of a statute, the words of the questioned 
statute should not be evaluated in the abstract but should be considered with 
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reference to the particular conduct of the defendant. The principle consistently 
followed is that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process 
of law." State v. Dolsby, 124 Idaho 271,275,858 P.2d 810,814 (Ct. A p p  1993) as 
quoting State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634, 651 P.2d 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The words used in the statute need not be strictly restated in the 
indictment. State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285,805 P.2d 491 (Ct.App.1991). However, 
the indictment must present a plain, precise, and definite statement of essential 
facts constituting the offenses charged, contain the elements of the offense 
charged, fairly inform the defendant of what he is being charged with, and 
enable him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions. State 
v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296,912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995). 
As this court has ruled in the companion opinion issued in this case today, 
the Indictment here gives a plain, precise and definitive statement of the essential 
facts with which Mr. Pifia is charged. Further, it is apparent that these facts give 
counsel a sufficient basis on which to prepare any defenses of facts that benefit 
him. For these reasons, Defendant's argument fails. 
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ii. The State will be required to prove 
kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt at 
trial. 
Due Process requires that any fact that has the effect of increasing the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be set forth in the indictment, duly submitted 
to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. N e w  Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466,120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). The Defendant argues that the holding of 
Apprendi requires dismissal of the murder charge against him. Ilowever, 
Apprendi does not mandate dismissal of the murder charge against the 
Defendant. The Idaho Supreme Court has distinguished Apprendi in holding that 
Idaho's sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial. See State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 929,104 P.3d 969, 971 (2005). Similarly 
here, the fact pattern discussed in Apprendi is not analogous to the case at bar. 
The Grand Jury made a probable cause finding, finding the relevant facts 
and applying those to the laws violated, giving adequate notice to the defendant 
of the charges that the State would pursue at trial. There are no surprise 
erthance~nents lurlting to be hoisted unawares upon Mr. Pifia. The State 
continues to have the burden of proving every essential element of the offense 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. There is nothing charged that would 
increase the penalty more than what is charged. The trial jury will ultimately 
decide if the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charged crimes. They will 
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not determine if he should have been charged with different, unmentioned 
crimes. 
C. The Felony Murder Statute is Constitutional. 
The defendant claims that Idaho's felony murder "scheme" fails to comply 
with due process requirements such as those articulated in In re Winship ,  397 U.S. 
358,364,90 S.Ct. 1068,1073 (1970) and Apprendi. The Defendant maintains that 
the while Idaho requires that the findings be made by a jury, Idaho law also 
provides excessive latitude for making such a determination. Mr. Pifia argues 
that the felony murder statute's language "in the commission of [one of the 
enumerated crimes]" is overbroad when applied through the concept of a 
"stream of events." CJ. State v. Fettevly, 109 Idaho 766, 771, 710 P.2d 1202, 1207 
(1986). Pifia maintains that the "stream of events" view violates his due process 
rights because it discourages the delineation of facts upon which the state relies 
in bringing the charge. 
There is no evidence that the "stream of events" view previously 
articulated and adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, id., violates Defendant's 
due process rights. The felony murder statute is constitutional according to 
established case law. In construing statutes, it is generalIy presumed that 
legislative acts are constitutional and that the state legislature has acted within its 
constitutional powers. State v. Rawson, 100 Idaho 308,311 597 P.2d 31,34 (1979). 
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Furthermore, doubts concerning the interpretation of statutes are to be resolved 
in favor of that which will render them constitutional. Id. See e.g. State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389,3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Pederson, 124 Idaho 179,857 P.2d 
658 (Ct. Apy.1993); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766,710 P.2d 1202 (Idaho 1985); 
State v. Lanl$ord, 113 Idaho 688,747 P.2d 710 (Idaho 1987). This court resolves 
such doubts in favor of constitutionality, and thereby denies the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Based up011 the foregoing analysis, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
First Degree Murder charge against him is denied. 
4" Dated this a day of May, 2006. 
/ G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGIDELIVERY 
I, Teresa Yocham, hereby certify that 011 th day of May, 2006, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand- 
delivered to the following persons: 
Grant Loebs Marilyn Paul 
Twin Falls County Prosecutor Twin Falls County Public Defender 
P.O. Box 126 P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 Twin Fall, ID 83303 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 13 
AND ORDER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR-06-0107 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS. ) AND ORDER R.E. 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
JUAN FUENTES-PIRA, ) DISMISS INDICTMENT 
) 
Defendant. ) 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
Grand Jury Indictment. Ms. Marilyn Paul represented the Defendant, Juan 
Fuentes-Pifia. Mr. Grant Loebs, Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney, 
appeared on behalf of the State. After reviewing the materials submitted by both 
parties, researching the applicable law, and hearing oral argument, the Motion 
for dismissal of the Indictment is denied and the Grand Jury Indictment will not 
be dismissed. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A Bill of Indictment was presented by a Twin Falls County Grand Jury on 
January 03,2006, charging Juan Carlos Fuentes-Pifia (Defendant) with the felony 
murder of Jesse Naranjo. 111 the indictment, the state alleges that on or about 
November 29,2005, the Defendant kidnapped Jesse Naranjo in violation of Idaho 
Code § 18-4501. In the course of the alleged kidnapping, Mr. Naranjo was shot in 
the abdomen and subsequently died, in violatiol~ of Idaho Code § 18-4001 and 
518-4003(d). After the bill in favor of indictment was returned by the Grand 
Jury, the Defendant was brought into custody, charged with Kidnapping and 
First Degree Murder and accordingly arraigned. An eight-day jury trial is set to 
commence on June 20,2006. 
On April 7,2006, Defendant, through his Counsel, filed two motions, a 
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and a Motion to Dismiss the First Degree 
Felony Murder charge. Oral arguments were heard on April 26,2006, at which 
the Defendant and the State both argued their positions. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In considering a motion to dismiss an indictment under Idaho Court 
Rule 6.6 and Idaho Code § 19-1107, the district court sits as a reviewing court, 
and it is the grand jury that is the fact-finder. In a grand jury proceeding, the 
district court may set aside the indictment if, given the evidence before the grand 
jury, the court concludes that the probable cause is insufficient to lead a 
reasonable person to believe that the accused committed the crime." State v. 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885,887,908 P.2d 578,580 (Ct. App. 1995); see also I.C.R. 
6.6(a); State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 482-83, 873 P.2d 122, 127-28 (1994). In 
accomplishing such a review, this court will make every legitimate inference that 
may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the indictment. See State v. 
Brandstetter 127 Idaho at 887, 908 P.2d at 580 (quoting State v. Will iams,  855 P.2d 
1337,1346 (Alaska App.1993)). 
The abuse of discretion standard applies when an appeal from a denial of 
a motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment is sought. See, e.g., State v. Card, 137 
Idaho 182, 184,45 P.3d 838, 840 (2002); State v. Bujandn-Velazquez, 129 Idaho 726, 
728, 932 P.2d 354,356 (1997). In determining whether the district court abused its 
discretiovl in denying a motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment, the appeals 
court will conduct a multi-tiered inquiry. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). First, [the court] must determine "whether the lower 
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court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion"; second, [the court] must 
determine "whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices"; and third, "whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Bzijanda-Velazquez, supua. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.7 states the four grounds for dismissing an 
indictment. These are: 
(a) A valid challenge to the array of grand jurors; 
(b) A valid challenge to an individual juror who served upon the 
grand jury which found the indictment; provided, the finding 
of the valid challenge to one or more members of the grand jury 
shall not be grounds for dismissal of the indictment if there 
were twelve or more qualified jurors concurring in the finding 
of the indictment; 
(c) That the charge contained within the indictment was previously 
submitted to a magistrate at preliminary hearing and dismissed 
for lack of probable cause; and, 
(d) That the indictment was not properly found, indorsed and 
presented as required by these rules or by the statutes of the 
state of Idaho. 
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ANALYSIS 
In the case at bar, Defendant asks this court to dismiss the indictment 
against him. The Defendant claims numerous procedural and substantive 
reasons why this court should grant his motions. The court has considered each 
of Defendant's twenty-six reasons individually and will discuss them in turn. 
1. THE PROCEDURAL QEFlClENClES IN THE MANNER IN 
WHICH THlS GRAND JURY WAS CONDUCTED, AS 
ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT, DO NOT MERIT A 
DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AS THE STATE HAS 
SUCCESSFULLY SHOWN THAT THE PROCEDUML 
MISTAKES, IF ANY, WERE HARMLESS AND DE 
MINIMIS. 
A. The Grand Jury Sellection And Empanelment 
Was Proper. 
Although the Defendant contends that individual grand jurors were 
challengeable and should have been excused, the transcript of the empanelment 
shows otherwise. On the day of voir dire and empanelment, over two hours 
were spent by the deputy prosecuting attorney and presiding District Judge 
selecting the Grand Jury in accordance with the requirements of Idaho statutes 
and Constitutional law. Both the judge and the deputy prosecutor questioned 
potential grand jurors and the chosen jurors were later instructed by the court. 
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Some of the potential grand jurors were excused by the court for legal 
cause.' Potential grand jurors were asked if they would be able to serve as a fair 
grand juror without any bias.2 Each juror who served agreed that he or she could 
be unbiased and fair and make a decision based on reason and the legal 
parameters applicable to the Grand Jury process. When the court and deputy 
prosecuting attorney asked if there was any reason why the potential jurors 
could not be fair, each juror that remained on the grand jury sat silent. 
Defendant asserts that the court should have disqualified individual 
jurors pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 6.l(c)(3). Specifically Defendant names 
grand juror number fifteen who is an actively working police officer in the city of 
Filer;3 grand juror number one whose niece's killer was convicted a few weeks 
earlier,4 although the grand juror stated that she had no significant involvement 
in the case, not even attending the trial;5 juror number four who was a friend of a 
case worker employed by the prosecuting attorney's ~ f f i ce ;~  and a nurse who 
worked two days a month in the emergency room and was presently a staff 
A potential grand juror was disinissed because she was pregnant and her due date was at hand. 
(Empanelment Transcript p.17-18,ll. 16-25,l-4). Another was dismissed because his employment 
frequently required that he travel (Empanelment Transcript p.21-23,Il.l-10). 
A grand juror was dismissed because she was "really not sure" whether she could be fair and 
impartial and not make decisio~is olely based on emotion. (Empanelment Traliscript p.50-54,ll. 
1-14). 
3 (Empanelment Transcript p.25,ll. 7-11). 
4 (Empanelment Transcript p.28,11.15-29). 
5 Id. at p.28-29,11.12-25, 1-21. 
6 (Empanelment Transcript p.18-20,l. 20-25,l-14.). 
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ed~ca tor .~  Each of these jurors was questioned about their abilities to serve on 
this grand jury. Each stated unequivocally that they could be fair and unbiased 
when determining whether the evidence supported the finding of an irtdictment. 
During the selection process, the court pointed out that it is important that 
a grand jury "form a good cross-section of our community."8 A fair and 
impartial jury is obviously fundamental to the proper functioning of a grand jury 
system; however, this court is not in a position to second-guess jurors who 
profess an ability and willingness to be fair and unbiased when serving. Jurors 
who happen to be police officers or nurses are not subject to automatic 
disqualification based upon their professions, any more than it would be right to 
disqualify a juror based solely upon his or her ethnic bacl<ground. C Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) (equal protection affords all jurors the 
right to serve). Other jurors, who have tangential contact with someone who 
worlcs for the prosecutor, or whose family member suffered a criminal act, also 
are not prohibited by such facts from serving. The Defendant has not presented 
any evidence in support of his conclusion that these jurors should have been 
dismissed. 
Furthermore, the Defendant has failed to meet the requirement of Rule 
6.7(b). Under Rule 6.7(b), the finding of the valid challenge to one or more 
' (Empanelment Transcript p.59-60, 11. 7-25, 1-12) 
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inembers of the grand jury shall not be grounds for dismissal of the indictment if 
there were twelve or more qualified jurors concurring in the finding of the 
indictment. Eve11 if the aforementioned jurors were excluded from the panel, 
there has been no showing that the remaining jurors would not have indicted the 
Defendant in any event. The Defendant's request in this regard is therefore 
denied. 
i. T h e  selection of the  presiding grand juror 
w a s  proper and accomplished by the  Court. 
The Court selected the presiding grand juror, as mandated by Idaho Code 
§ 19-1010 and I.C.R. 6.l(d). The Defendant states that the involvement of the 
deputy prosecutor in the selection of the presiding grand juror was improper; 
however, the Defendant offers no evidence or reasoning supporting his 
statement. 
The sole requirement of Rule 6.l(d) and Idaho Code 3 19-1010, is that the 
Court select the presiding grand juror and administer a specific oath to that juror. 
The rule leaves to the court exactly how the court carries out its mandate. In the 
case at bar, it is evident that the court followed the rules. The court stated "[tlhe 
prosecutor and I will convene in my chambers to pick a foreman, or presiding 
grand jurormg (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court states, "[alt this time the 
8 (Empanelment Transcript p.16,11.19-22) 
9 (Empanelment 'Transcript p.69,11.7-12). 
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court has met with the prosecutor and determined to appoint Juror Number 843 
as Presiding Juror of this Grand Jury."1° It is apparent that the court was the 
party making the decision about who would be the presiding juror. The 
prosecutor's involvement was not overly influential. There is no evidence that 
the court did not comply with its mandated role. 
ii. The oath procedure complied with Rules 
6.1 (c)(3) and (d) and was equivalent to 
Idaho Code Zj 19-1011 and 1012. 
The Defendant asserts that the grand jury was not sworn in accordance 
with I.C. 5 19-1011 and 5 19-1012. Thesetwo statutes set forth the procedure for 
oaths of the presiding grand juror and the grand jurors. I.C. 5 19-1011 sets forth 
the form in which the oath is administered to the presiding grand juror. Section 
19-1012 then states that the same oath given to the presiding grand juror must 
immediately be presented to the grand jury panel as a whole. Because of this, 
Defendant claims that the role of the presiding grand juror has been lessened, as 
the important leadership role of the presiding grand juror was not suitably 
impressed upon the entire grand jury. 
The oath under § 19-1012 was not administered; instead, the entire grand 
jury was sworn-in with the oath required by I.C.R. 6.l(c)(3). After the panel was 
sworn, two jurors were chosen by the court to be tlie presiding grand juror and 
'0 Id. at p.70, 11. 7-10. 
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deputy grand juror. These two individuals were then duly sworn as mandated 
by Rule 6.l(d). 
Although the approaches differ between I.C. 5 19-1011 and § 19-1012 and 
I.C.R. 6.l(c)(3) and (d), the substance of both oaths are functionally the same. 
Moreover, "when court rules and statutes conflict in matters of procedure 
entrusted to the courts, then the statute must give way [to the rule]." State v. 
Mathews, 129 Idaho 865,876,934 P.2d 931,942 (1997) (Silak, J. dissenting). Here 
there is no substantive difference between the statute and the rule, but if there 
were, the court properly followed the requirements of the rule. 
The oath under I.C.R. Rule 6.1(d) impresses upon both the presiding 
grand jurors and the entire grand jury the critical and weighty responsibilities 
the presiding officers have. There is no indication that the presiding and/or 
deputy presiding grand jurors did not otherwise carry out their duties. 
Defendant's Due Process rights have not been violated as the grand jury and its 
presiding and deputy jurors were sworn-in correctly in conformance with the 
rule. 
iii. The prosecutor's comments on jury 
nullification were not prejudicial. 
The Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's comments on jury nullification 
tainted the grand jury by improperly instructing the jury in the consideration of 
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degrees of the offense complained of. Such conduct could be an impermissible 
incursion into the province of the Grand Jury. Defendant cites State v. Plzinney, 
13 Idaho 307,89 P.634 (1907), wliich states: "[w]henever a crime is distinguished 
into degrees, the jury, must find the degree of the crime of which [the defendant] 
is guilty." 
However, this Court does not find that the comments by the deputy 
prosecutor are prejudicial. "The prosecutor is expected to act as the grand jury's 
legal advisor, and as such, may appropriately explain the law and express an 
opinion on the legal significance of the evidence but should give due deference 
to [the grand jury's] status as an independent legal body." People v. Meyers, 617 
P.2d 808, 812 (Colo.1980) (quoting ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution 
Function § 3-3.5(a) (1979) (as quoted in State v. Edmonson 113 Idaho 230,238,743 
P.2d 459, 467 (1987)). 
Generally, prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only when it 
reaches the level of a corrstitutional due process violation. In order to be entitled 
to dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds, the defendant must 
affirmatively show prejudice caused by the misconduct. State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 
877,606 P.2d 981 (1980). Dismissal is a drastic remedy and should be exercised 
only in extreme and outrageous situations, and therefore, the defendant has a 
heavy burden. In a grand jury proceeding, "prejudicial effect" means the 
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defendant would not have been indicted but for the misconduct. See State v 
Edmonson 113 Idaho 230,237,743 P.2d 459,466 (1987). To determine whether 
misconduct would support a dismissal, a reviewing court must balance the 
gravity and the seriousness of any misconduct with the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the probable cause finding. 
As stated above, the burden rests with the criminal defendant to make an 
initial showing that the misconduct rises to the level of prejudice. Absent the 
showing of prejudice, a reviewing court will not second-guess the grand jury. 
Here, the alleged misconduct alluded to is so insignificant that the court does not 
need to inquire into the strength of the probable cause evidence. The Defendant 
has not met his burden to show that the prosecutor's actions were so outrageous 
as to lead to the dismissal of the indictment. As such, the Defendant's accusation 
must fail. 
B. The Grand Jury Proceedings Were Conducted In A 
Proper Manner. 
i. The presiding grand juror's actions in 
allowing each of the grand jurors to serve 
were proper. 
Defendant asserts that because the prosecutor was involved in the 
selection of the presiding and deputy presiding grand juror, there was an 
improper alignment of grand jurors with the state. I-Iowever, he offers no 
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evidence of this, only the mere possibility that this could occur. This Court has 
failed to find any evidence in support of this theory. 
Certainly the integrity of a grand jury is paramount. The prosecutor is 
restrained from unduly influencing the grand jury's decision or injecting herself 
into the process. This Court stated as much when it told the grand jurors that 
they are not the "prosecutor's agent" and grand jurors "must exercise [their] own 
judgment."" There is no evidence that the grand jury did not heed this 
instruction. Arguing that the opportunity to improperly persuade is equivalent 
with actual improper persuasion is unconvincing. Only if an impropriety took 
place, will a due process violation occur, otherwise, the court will not revisit the 
grand jury's finding. 
In this case, the selection of the presiding grand juror and the deputy 
presiding grand juror was proper. It satisfied the procedural requirements. The 
presiding grand juror has the authority to rule upon the disqualification of any 
grand juror.12 Defendant's argument that the presiding juror had the authority, 
yet chose not to use it, is unreasonable and must fail. 
'1  (Empanelment Transcript p.81-82 11.23-25, 1-12). 
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ii. The prosecutor's mode of presentation, 
without formal joinder, was not prejudicial. 
The Defendant asserts that although there was no formal joinder of 
Defendant's case with other cases, the State created a type of "informal joinder" 
when it combined the grand jury proceedings of this case with a co-defendant's 
case, State v. Shores CR-06-108 and another murder case, State v. Nice CR-05- 
11278. This informal "joil-tder" was theoretically prejudicial because it unfairly 
tainted the Defendant as a "bad guy." 
There is no prohibition against grand juries hearing cases against different 
defendants in the same presentation as long as the grand jury is instructed that 
each represents a different case and they must vote separately on each charge.13 
The Defendant provides no support for his opinion that the State regarded 
Defendant as the "bad guy." Furthermore, there appears to be no joinder of any 
of the three cases, informal or otherwise. 
A sitting grand jury heard evidence on each case at the same time, yet 
each case was separate. The jury independently considered each charge and the 
facts surrounding each indictment. While there was one witness who testified 
before the grand jury for two different cases, the grand jury recessed between the 
l 2  Ida110 Criminal Rule 6.l(d)(4). 
(Grand Jury Transcript p. 1 1,ll. 19-23). 
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cases and the grand jurors were properly instructed as to each case's 
independent status. l4 As such, this argument likewise fails. 
i i i .  T h e  state's references t o  an  "indictment" 
or cccharge,B without always using t h e  word 
c'proposed" were  not prejudicial. 
Defendant argues that the State's repeated use of the term "charge" or 
"indictment" in reference to the proposed indictment implied that the State was 
inviting the grand jury to be its rubber stamp. However, this argument is not 
convincing. During both the grand jury empanelment and the grand jury 
proceedings and return of the indictment, the state prosecutors repeatedly 
counseled the grand jurors that the draft indictments were mere 
recommendations or proposals. For example, the prosecutor stated: 
a "...if you should find an indi~tment."'~ 
"And now if you would read the indictment, proposed indictment, 
for Mr. Pina."I6 
"And if you would now read the indictment, proposed indictment, 
for Mr. Pina."17 
". . .this case in the proposed indictment alleges.. ."la 
0 "...the proposed indictment against Mr. Pina."" 
'4 (Empanelment Transcript p.62 11. 7-21) 
'5 (Grand Jury Transcript p.10, 1.15). 
'6 (Grand Jury Transcript p.62,ll.l-2). 
'7 (Grand Jury Transcript p.98,11.5-6). 
18 (Grand Jury Transcript p.111 1.25). 
19 (Grand Jury Transcript p.115 1.21). 
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The list goes on. The Court only mentions these as examples of the 
proceeding as a whole. There are numerous times where the State referred to the 
document as a proposed indictment. 
Because the State sometimes referred to the proposed indictment without 
the word "proposed," is not reason enough to invalidate it. There is no evidence 
that the grand jury "rubber stamped the indictment proposal from the State 
because of some kind of veiled reference to "indictment" or "charge" without the 
qualifying use of "proposed each and every tiine. When the transcript is read in 
its entirety, it is apparent that the State's attorneys informed the grand jury on 
numerous occasions that the charge or indictment was merely a proposal. The 
grand jury was instructed as suchZ0 and the Defendant has therefore shown no 
error in this regard. 
iv. The Prosecutorys Failure to provide a "NO 
TRUE BILLfy form as a companion 
alternative to the "A TRUE BILLyy of 
indictment was not prejudicial. 
The Defendant claims that by electing to provide proposed indictments to 
the grand jury, while not providing forms on whicfi the grand jury could elect to 
not indict, the state is showing its preference for indictment and making it more 
difficult for the grand jury not to indict. However, this argument laclcs merit. In 
20 (Grand Jury Transcript p.366 11.20-25, p.367 11.1-19). 
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the case at bar, the actions of the prosecutor providing "A TRUE BILL," did not 
unfairly prejudice the Defendant, 
Not surprisingly, the prosecutor desired the grand jury to indict. The 
prosecutor is allowed, even required, to present all the evidence that is needed to 
indict an alleged defendant of a particular crime. The transcript of the Grand 
Jury proceedings readily shows that the prosecution informed the grand jury 
numerous times that they should not indict if they found that the State had not 
offered evidence sufficient to support a claim of indictment. The prosecutor is 
also duty-bound "to draw bills of indictments. . . ." Idaho Code § 31-2604(4). 
There is no reference in the statute to a concomitant duty to also draw "no tme" 
bills. 
Thus, there is no case law or statute that requires the Prosecutor to 
provide a "NO TRUE BILL" form of indictment. Here the Grand Jury procedure 
was followed and the Defendant was not unfairly disadvantaged by the 
Prosecutor's actions. 
v. The State, as well as the Court, properly 
and adequately informed the Grand Jury 
how to proceed if the Grand Jury did not 
wish to indict. 
The Defendant asserts that the State did not adequately inform the grand 
jurors what they should do if they choose not to indict. However, the record 
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before the court does not support this assertion. During the presentation of 
evidence before the Grand Jury, the State's attorney declared: "[alnd you just 
need to make sure that when you vote, you vote on what you want to vote on, 
and if it's either for or against indictment, you're voting on the right questioi~."~~ 
111 addition, the Prosecutor declared, "If you feel the evidence is unconvincing 
and you don't believe he did anything criminal in nature, then you would 
obviously want to reject filing an u~dictment."~~ 
There is no reasonable argument that that the Grand Jury was unaware of 
the procedure it could follow if it wished to reject the proposed indictment. The 
transcript shows that the Grand Jury was adequately instructed how to proceed 
if they were not convinced an indictment was warranted. 
vi. The prosecutor's failure to advise that a 
person's refusal to testify cannot be used 
against him or her is inconsequential. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2(d) requires the prosecutor advise the Grand Jury 
"...that if a person refuses to testify this fact cannot be used against him or her." 
In the case at bar, the prosecutor did not give this advice. However, this 
argument by the Defendant is insignificant. This Rule was designed to prevent a 
person who wishes to exercise his Constitutional right to not testify, from being 
unfairly labeled as someone who is hiding something. 
2' (Grand Jury Transcript p.13111.9-16). 
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The situation contemplated by the rule did not occur in this case. At no 
time did any witness refuse to testify; every witness who was called to testify, 
did so. Further, the Court instructed the jury of its obligation in this regarding 
during the general charge to the Grand Jurors. Given the record before the court 
there is no basis for this assertion and therefore the Defendant's argument in this 
regard must fail. 
!I. THE ALLEGED SUBSTANTIVE DEFICIENCIES IN THE 
MANNER IN WHICH THIS GRAND JURY WAS 
CONDUCTED DO NOT MERIT A DISMISSAL OF THE 
INDICTMENT. 
A. In Determining Whether A Crime Has Been 
Committed And Whether The Defendant 
Committed The Crime, The Grand Jury Applied 
The Appropriate Standard Of Proof. 
The defendant claims that the Grand Jury was not instructed that the 
evidence must be sufficient to warrant a conviction by a trial jury under a 
reasonable doubt standard. Furthermore the defendant claims that the Grand 
Jury was not instructed on how it must comply with the due process rights 
guaranteed by the 5"', 6"', 8Ih and 14"' Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Sections Six and Thirteen of the Idaho Constitution. 
Defendant cites two cases in support of his position: In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990). 
22 (Grand Jury Transcript p.384 11.11-20). 
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In Re Winship holds that due process of law requires that the prosecution 
prove at trial every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Cage v. Louisiana, a per curium opinion, stands for the 
proposition that it is never permissible for any combination of words to suggest a 
lesser standard for conviction than beyond a reasonable doubt. In Cage, the 
Court found that the phrases "grave uncertainty" "actual substantial doubt" and 
"moral certainty," employed jointly in a reasonable doubt instruction, violated 
the Due Process Clause. 498 U.S. at 41,111 S.Ct. at 329 - 330. 
The reasonable doubt standard required for conviction in a criminal trial 
is not required at the grand jury stage. See State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230,238, 
743 P.2d 459,467 (1987) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a much higher 
standard than is required by Idaho law in a grand jury proceeding); see also 
Gasper v. District Court, 74 Idaho 388,264 P.2d 679,683 (1953) (the statutory 
requirement that the jury "ought to find an indictment when all the evidence 
before them, talcen together if unexplained or unco~~troverted, would, in their 
judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury" is not a reasonable doubt 
standard). 
Idaho Code g19-1107 states that a Grand Jury "ought to find an indictment 
when all the evidence before them, talcen together, if explained or 
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uncontradicted, would, in their judgment, warrant a coiiviction by a trial jury." 
Rule 6.6(a) sets fortli the standard directly: 
(a) Sufficiency of Evidence to Warrant Indictment. If it appears 
to the grand jury after evidence has been presented to it that 
an offense has been committed and that there is probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed it, the jury 
ought to find an indictment. Probable cause exists when the 
grand jury has before it such evidence as would lead a 
reasonable person to believe an offense has beell committed 
and that the accused party has probably committed the 
offense. 
The standard for indictment is clear. Idaho Code 519-1107 does not 
require that the Grand Jury find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Grand 
Jury transcript shows that the Grand Jury was instructed on the proper standard 
to indict Mr. Pifia. 
B. In Idaho, Defendants Do Not Generally Have A 
Constitutional Right To A Preliminary Wearing, As 
The Idaho Constitution Provides That A Felony 
May Be Brought In District Court After A 
Preliminary Hearing Or A Grand Jury Proceeding. 
Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution provides that no person shall 
be held to answer for any criminal offense unless on presentment or indictment 
of a grand jury or on information of the prosecutor after commitment by a 
magistrate. Unless indicted by a grand jury, a defendant, when charged in a 
complaint with any felony, is entitled to a preliminary hearing. I.C.R. 5.l(a). 
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Idaho law is thus clear that a prosecutor has the option to proceed with a 
criminal complaint and a preliminary hearing, or through an indictment by a 
grand jury. As the Court of Appeals has noted: 
In State v. Edrnonson, 113 Idaho 230, 743 P.2d 459 (1987), the 
Idaho Supreme Court addressed our Constitution's provision for 
alternative charging procedures, either by indictment or 
information. The court noted that the Idaho Constitution does not, 
on its face, place any limitation on the prosecutor's choice to 
proceed by either alternative. Id. at 233, 743 P.2d at 562. If an 
information is used, the defendant has a right to a preliminary 
hearing. Id. The purpose of both a grand jury proceeding and a 
preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause. Id. at 234, 743 
P.2d at 463. Any advantage that a preliminary hearing affords a 
defendant is purely incidental to that purpose. Id. 
State v. Martinez,  128 Idaho 104, 110-111, 910 P.2d 776, 783-84 (Ct. App. 
The Defendant has argued that because he was unable to coilfront 
witnesses in the Grand Jury, pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Crawford v. Waslzington, 541 U.S. 36,124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), the indictment is 
unlawful and should be dismissed. 
While C ~ a w f o r d  significantly alters the Confrontation Clause analysis vis- 
i-vis the traditional hearsay evidentiary rules, Crawford has not been extended to 
require or provide all defendants a right to cross-examine in a grand jury 
proceeding, or to have the right to a preliminary hearing in order to exercise a 
right to confront the witnesses against hiin or her. "The right to confrontation of 
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those testifying against a defendant, is a trial right," and does not apply to grand 
jury proceedings. Addkisan v. State, 608 So.2d 304,312 (Miss.1992) (citing 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 107 S.Ct. 989 (1987)). 
The Confrontation Clause bars the use of testimonial evidence at  trial 
unless the statement was subjected to "testing in the crucible of cross- 
examination." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62,124 S.Ct. at 1370 . Defendant argues 
that because he was unable to confront witnesses in the Grand Jury, the 
indictment is unlawful and should be dismissed; however, Defendant offers no 
further case law that supports this position. Although the holding in Crawford 
reinforces the right to confront witnesses, it provides no authority for the 
Defendant's proposed right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in a grand 
jury proceeding. Taking Defendant's argument at face value would eviscerate 
the raison d'etre for grand juries, essentially turning the probable cause hearing 
into a mini trial. There would be little, if any, distinction between a grand jury 
and a petit jury. 
The purpose of a grand jury proceeding is to determine whether sufficient 
probable cause exists to require the defendant to answer the charges against him 
in a trial. The determination of guilt or innocence is reserved for a petit jury. 
The Defendant's right to confront accusers does not exist in a grand jury 
proceedii~g and his argument thus fails. 
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C. The indictment Will Not Be Dismissed Based 
Upon The Illegal Admission Of Hearsay 
Evidence; The Grand Jury Was Provided More 
Than Enough Legally Sufficient Evidence To 
Sustain The Indictment. 
i. The legal standard. 
A grand jury's consideration of hearsay evidence is not necessarily a fatal 
error. The guidance specified in State v. Edmonson, supra, is controlling in this 
regard. In Edmonson,  the Idaho Supreme Court declared "where legally 
sufficient evidence will sustain an ii~dictment, improperly admitted hearsay 
evidence will not overturn the indictment." 113 Idaho at 237,743 P.2d at 466. 
Other jurisdictions agree that an indictment will be sustained if, after excluding 
the inadmissible evidence, there remains sufficient admissible evidence to indict. 
Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981); State v. Miyazaki ,  64 Hawaii 611, 
645 P.2d 1340 (1982); State v. Terrell, 283 N.W.2d 529 (Minn.1979); People v 
Baclcus, 23 Cal.3d 360, 152 Cal.Rptr. 710, 590 P.2d 837 (1979); and Franklin v. State, 
89 Nev. 382,513 P.2d 1252 (1973). 
i i .  Most of the statements, of which the 
Defendant complains, do not involve 
hearsay. 
The Defendant asserts that he was indicted based upon inadmissible 
hearsay. The alleged hearsay statements include: 
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testimony given by Jacob Schmidt of statements he heard from an 
unidentifiable person about what the purported victim was doingz3; 
a statement of "don't hit me" from an unidentified source2*; 
testimony of detective Gambrel's discussion and confession of 
Johnny Shoresz5; 
* testimony of Jacob DeGarmo concerning statements that were 
supposedly made in Spanish, which DeGarmo understands very 
iittle and had to rely on facial expression and gestures.26 
These statements, except for those by Detective Gambrel, are not hearsay. 
Other than Gambrel's statement, the statements were not offered to prove 
anything except what the witness heard and/or saw. They were not offered to 
show what the witness heard was in fact true, which is the benchmark for 
"hearsay." I.R.E. 801(c). Talcen in their entirety, there was actually so little 
hearsay evidence that when the hearsay is properly removed, there is still 
sufficient evidence to indict. 
The only statement that qualifies as hearsay evidence is the statement by 
Detective Gambrel. When the detective testified, the State instructed the Grand 
Jury that the detective's recitation of Johnny Shores' statements was not to be 
used against the Defendant Juan Pifia, as they were hearsay. The statements 
were solely to be used against the declarant. 
23 (Grand Jury Transcript p.144 11.16-18, p.147 1.24). 
24 (Grand Jury Transcript p.164 1.16). 
25 (Grand Jury Trai~script p.341-342 11.22-25). 
26 (Grand Jury Transcript p.276 11.9-15). 
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Where improper testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the 
trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily 
presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely. See State v. Hill, 
140 Idaho 625,631,97 P.3d 1014,1020 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 192, 646 P.2d 
429,434 (Ct.App.1982). As noted by the Court in State v. Hill: 
No less an authority than the United States Supreme Court has 
proclaimed: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an 
instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently 
presented to it, unless there is an 'overwhelming probability' 
that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, 
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would 
be 'devastating' to the defendant. 
Gveer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8,107 S.Ct. 3102 (1987) (citations 
omitted). 
140 Idaho at 631,97 P.3d at 1020. 
While Idaho has not adopted this same rationale for grand jury 
proceedings, there is no reason the same conclusion would not follow. This 
court does not find any "overwhelming probability" that Detective Gambrel's 
recitation of Johnny Shores' statement would have caused the grand jury to 
disregard the prosecuting attorney's ii~struction to apply Shores' statement to 
Shores only. Moreover, Shores' statement is not "devastating" to the Defendant 
here. Even after striking the statement from the record, there is still more than 
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ample evidence upon which the jury could find probable cause to indict the 
Defendant. As such, the indictment will stand as against the Defendant's 
argument in this regard. 
D. The Indictment Will Not Be Dismissed On The 
Grounds Of improperly Admitted Speculative 
Testimony. 
The Defendant claims that during the testimony of the State's witnesses, 
some witnesses engaged in a "very significant amount of sheer speculation." 
However, as with the cornplaints made by Defendant concerning hearsay 
evidence, the speculative testimony, if stricken, is not sufficient to cause the 
indictment to be dismissed. Beyond that, the testimony complained of as 
speculative is not improper and is admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
The testifying pathologist, Dr. Groben, testified regarding the distance 
between the victim and the shooter in this case,27 based upon the nature of the 
wounds on the deceased. Dr. Groben explained that he came to his decision 
about the distance because of a photo he once saw of similar types of wounds 
from a determinable distance28 Such testimony is not speculative. Expert 
witnesses are allowed to testify using books, documents and other expert 
opinions upon which an expert witness in forensic pathology relies. 
27 (Grand Jury Transcript p.76 11.16-17). There is no dispute that the shooter was Johnny Shores. 
The court questions whether this testimony had any effect in the case against Juan PiAa. 
28 (Grand Jury Transcript p.77 11.8-14). 
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Furthermore, Dr. Grobe~i qualified his statements, thus helping the jury to 
understand the basis for his comments. As such, the speculative nature, if any, of 
his conclusion about the distance, was shown to the grand jury and the jurors 
were allowed to weigh the basis for the doctor's testimony when evaluati~ig the 
evidence ill the case. 
Another witness, Jacob DeGarmo, testified regarding Spanish words he 
heard at the time and location of the alleged murder. As a lay witnesses, any 
testimony offered by Mr. DeGarmo needs to satisfy I.R.E. 701. This Rule states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of 
the witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in 
issue, and (c) not based on scientific, tecli~iical or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
Pursuant to this standard, DeGarmo testified as to Spanish words based 
upon his "perception" of the accompanying body language which DeGarmo 
witnessed. DeGarmo's interpretation of words coupled witli the body language 
is not speculative; his statements solely about the meaning of specific words is 
speculative. DeGarmo's testimony was couched in terms of what he perceived, 
along with what he heard. He made clear to the grand jury that he did not 
understand the Spanish lang~age.~9 The grand jury was thus allowed to evaluate 
29 (Grand Jury Trailscript p.276 11.9-12). 
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his testimony in light of the foundation offered for it. Even striking the 
testimony, as stated previously, will not invalidate the indictment. The court will 
not dismiss the indictment on the basis that DeGarmo offered his opinion 
regarding words in the Spanish language. 
E. The Grand Jury Was Properly instructed On The 
Charge Of Kidnapping. 
The Defendant contends that because a trial court must instruct a jury on 
lesser-included offenses which are supported by a reasonable view of the 
evidence, the State should do the same in grand jury proceedings. There is no 
case law, statute, rule or precedent to support Defendant's position. Yet, in the 
case at bar, the Defendant argues that the State is obligated to instruct the Grand 
Jury on the lesser-included offense of false imprisonment. Because the State did 
not offer such an instruction, Mr. Pifia seeks a dismissal of the felony murder 
charge. 
i. In the charge at hand, the Defendant is 
either not guilty or guilty of felony murder; 
there is no lesser-included offense other 
than kidnapping upon which the jury should 
have been Enstructed. 
False imprisonment is not a lesser-included offense of felony murder, as it 
is not a predicate charge to support a felony murder conviction pursuant to 
Idaho Code 518-4003(d). Cf: State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534,540,37 P.3d 625,631 (Ct. 
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App. 2001) (robbery, as a predicate crime for felony murder, is a lesser-included 
offense of felony murder). 
Here, the Grand Jury was to determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to indict Defendant on the charge of felony murder. The predicate act 
for the allegations here is the crime of lcidnapping. It would not have been 
proper for the Grand Jury to indict on a lesser charge other than the kidnapping 
itself. 
Lesser-included offenses should not be given to allow jurors to pick and 
choose between potential crimes. See State v. Wilson, 145 Ohio App.3d 374,377, 
763 N.E.2d 196, 199 (2001) (the jury is not permitted merely to piclc and choose 
between the major crime and any lesser included offense); Arevalo v. State, 943 
S.W.2d 887,889 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (a determination of whether an instruction 
on a lesser included crime should be given to a jury is not solved by merely 
determining the crime charged includes the lesser offense because juries are not 
to be given the discretion or freedom to piclc and choose what offense the 
accused should be found guilty of). 
If the State is to bring a serious charge against an individual, they are 
required to provide the evidence sufficient to support that claim. Indeed, Idaho 
case law and statutes require that a trial jury acquit on the more serious charge 
before even considering a lesser-included offense. See Idaho Code §19-2132(c); 
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State v. Tuejo, 132 Idaho 872,879, 979 P.2d 1230,1237 (Ct. App. 1999). Tl~e idea 
that a grand jury should be allowed to choose between potential crimes offends 
the notion of justice because the responsibility to prove a crime was committed 
could then shift from the prosecution to the grand jury. There is no legal 
authority requiring the grand jury to be given this authority. The motion is 
therefore denied as to this issue. 
ii. f he lesser-included charges provided the 
grand jury in the Shores case do not 
mandate a similar procedure for Mr. Piiia. 
To support his argument regarding lesser-included offenses, Defendant 
avers that during the Grand Jury proceedings for Johnny Shores, a co-defendant 
of this alleged crime, the State gave lesser-included offense instructions. The 
State also gave instructions on some defenses to the charge Mr. Shores was 
alleged to have committed. Due to the relationship between the kidnapping and 
the failure of the State to instruct on the offense of false imprisonment, the 
Defendant maintains that he was unfairly prejudiced and improperly indicted. 
In contrast, the State argues that the determination of whether a particular 
crimeis a lesser included offense of the crime charged is a matter for a trial jury 
to adjudicate, once that particular stage of the trial is reached. It is the petit jury 
that decides lesser-included offel-tses, not the Grand Jury. In fact, the State's 
attorney explailzed to the Grand Jury that "[the trial jury] can decide for or 
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against the charge that they're presented with, and sometimes there are what are 
called lesser included charges that they can consider, but they have to decide first 
on the main charges, and only if they decide to acquit on that charge, can they 
consider lesser included charges."30 
This is a correct reading of the law. The standard of proof for a Grand 
Jury to indict is probable cause. Grand Jurors review the evidence and decide 
whether they believe the person alleged by the State committed an offense. 
There is ample proof to suggest that this Grand Jury did just that. The questions 
asked by the Grand Jurors show they toolc their calling seriously and came to a 
decision by following the correct statutes and standards. 
Mr. Shores' case is readily distinguishable from Defendant's charge and 
the procedure used to arrive at the indictment. The Grand Jury sitting in the 
Shores case had the option of indicting Mr. Shores on any one of the homicide 
crimes the State presented, because the predicate crimes for first-degree murder 
were all potentially committed in Shores' case. The Shores Grand Jury 
determined the evidence supported the specific crime the Grand Jury indicted 
him on. The State had no obligation or authority to offer similar options to the 
Grand Jurors sitting on this case. The Grand Jury was solely to decide if the 
30 (Grand Jury Transcript p. 369 1.25; p.370 11.1-10). 
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Defendant was to be indicted on a felony murder charge by determining whether 
the predicate kidnapping charge was committed. 
Once again, the Court reiterates that the Grand Jury was properly 
instructed as to the appropriate, controlling law. The standard of proof for a 
Grand Jury to find an indictment is probable cause. I-Iere, this Court determines 
that the Grand Jury found probable cause that the Defendant committed the 
crime with which he was being charged. In this stage of the criminal proceeding, 
there is no obligation to instruct the Grand Jury on a lesser-included offense. 
The trial court is to instruct on any lesser-included crimes and then only if the 
evidence supports such a conclusion. 
F. The Indictment Gives Sufficient Notice To The 
Defendant Of The Charges Against Him. 
The Defendant argues that the Indictment issued by the Grand Jury fails 
to give adequate notice of the facts that the State intends to rely on and therefore 
is prejudicial to the Defendant. The Defendant asserts that the higher threshold 
of reasonable doubt is required. He lists numerous cases to support his theory, 
including In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970), Jones v. United States, 
526 U,S, 227,119 S.Ct. 1215 (1999), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,120 
S.Ct. 2348 (2000). 
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These cases do not change the Idaho standard regarding sufficiency of 
notice provided in an indictment or information. This issue presents a question 
of law for the court. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296,300,912 P.2d 664,668 
(Ct.App.1995); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285,287,805 P.2d 491,493 
(Ct.App.1991). 
"An [indictment] is legally sufficient if it contains 'a plain, concise and 
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."' 
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b). See also State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 926,935 P.2d 183, 
189 (Ct. App. 1997); I.C. 5 19-1409(2): an indictment must contain "[a] statement 
of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, and in such 
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is 
intended." 
Ultimately, the sufficiency of the charging document depends upon 
whether it fulfills the basic functions of a pleading instrument by informing the 
defendant of the charges against which he must defend and enabling him to 
plead an acquittal or conviction in order to avoid reprosecution for the same 
offense. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41,46,89 P.3d 881, 886 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. 
Coleman, 128 Idaho 466,471,915 P.2d 28,33 (Ct.App.1996); Holcomb, 128 Idaho 
at 300,912 P.2d at 668. As the Court of Appeals noted in State v. Dorsey, 139 
Idaho 149,151,75 P.3d 203,205 (Ct. App. 2003): 
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The sufficiency of an information is tested by a functional 
analysis encompassing two inquiries: (1) whether the pleading 
contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the 
defendant of the charge which must be defended against; and (2) 
whether the information enables the defendant to plead an 
acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same 
offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 
2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590, 620 (1974). An information must be specific 
enough to advise a defendant as to the particular section of the 
statute he or she is being charged with having violated and, in 
addition, must set forth a concise statement of the facts constituting 
the alleged offense sufficient that the particular offense may be 
identified wit11 certainty as to time, place and persons involved. 
State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204,211,404 P.2d 347,351 (1965). 
The court finds that the Indictment here fulfills these two inquiries 
and it adequately apprises Mr. Pifia of the charges against him. His 
argument in this regard therefore fails. 
G. Because Each Of Defendant's Other Arguments 
Fail, His "Totality Of The Circumstances" 
Argument Must Also Fail. 
Defendant cites State v. Jones, wherein the court held that based on the 
"totality of the circumstances," the grand jury proceedings exhibited enough 
prejudice towards the accused, that the indictment was dismissed. 125 Idaho 
Defendant maintains that he was unfairly prejudiced by the grand jury 
selection, proceedings and indictment itself. He argues that there was sufficient 
prejudice to warrant a complete dismissal. However, because Defendant's other 
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arguments fail, this argument must also fail. Every legitimate inference that may 
be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the indictment. State v. 
Brandstetter 127 Idaho 885,887,908 P.2d 578,580 (Idaho App. 1995) as quoting 
State v. Williams, 855 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Alaska App.1993). Although this court has 
not found any errors, if there were any, they were de  minimus. The "totality of 
the circumstances" argument is thus denied. 
CONCLUSION 
In considering the indictment and the proceedings as a whole, the jury 
selection, evidentiary proceedings and the indictment were reasonable. There is 
no evidence or legal cause why the indictment against the Defendant should be 
dismissed. This court will therefore exercise its discretion and deny Defendant's 
motions in all respects. 
&?{gof May, 2006. Dated this - 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGJDELIVERY 
I, Teresa Yocham, hereby certify that on the day of May, 2006, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand- 
delivered to the following persons: 
Grant Loebs Marilyn Paul 
Twin Falls County Prosecutor Twin Falls County Public Defender 
P.O. Box 126 P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 Twin Fall, ID 83303 
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Defendant: Pina, Juan Carlos Fuentes 
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User: BARTLETT 
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Assigned judge: G. Richard Bevan 
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Minutes clerk: Teresa Yocham 
Minutes date: 06/01/2006 
Start time: 08:56 AM 
End time: 08:56 AM 
Audio tape number: 
Prosecutor: Grant Loebs 
Defense attorney: Marilyn Paul 
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Tape Counter: 1000 
Tape Counter: 128 
Tape Counter: 128 
Tape Counter: 129 
Tape Counter: 138 
Tape Counter: 141 
Tape Counter: 142 
Tape Counter: 143 
Court addressed the prospective jurors. The clerk read the roll. 
Court introduced Counsel for the State. Grant Loebs and Suzanne Craig. Court introduced 
the defendant, Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina, and Counsel for the defendant, Marilyn Paul 
and Stan Holloway 
Court informed the prospective jurors about the charges filed against Mr. Pina. 
The prospective jurors were duly sworn. 
Court addressed and admonished the jurors. 
Court excused Counsel and the court staff. 
Court in recess. 
Court convened. 
Court addressed the prospective jurors. 
Court called the roll of the jurors. 
Court addressed the prospective jurors. Court introduced Counsel for the State of Idaho, 
Grant Loebs and the Defendant Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina and counsel Marilyn Paul and 
Stan Holloway. 
The prospective jurors were duly sworn. 
Court addressed and admonished the jurors. 
Court excused the court personnel 
Court in recess. 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0 .  Box 126 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126 
(208)734-1155 
ISB # 4444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWlN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR 06-1 07 
1 
v. ) EX-PARTE MOTION FOR 
1 COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 
) OF WITNESS JOEL PETERSON 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 
) 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, the Defendant by and through his attorney, and hereby moves ex-parte for 
an order of the Court compelling the attendance of witness Joel Peterson in the jury trial in the 
above-entitled matter. This motion is based up011 Idaho Code $ 19-3009, and is submitted for the 
reasons set forth in the accompanying affidavit. 
This motion is submitted ex-parte due to the necessity of avoiding revealing the materiality 
of this witness' testimony to the other party. 
The name of Joel Peterson has been disclosed in discovery and was disclosed to prospective 
MOTION -1- 
jurors. 
DATED This ( S  day of June, 2006. 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MOTION -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION, was delivered on the 5 day of June, 2006, to the following: 
GRANT LOEBS 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR 
MOTION -3- 
OFFICE OF TI-IE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. Box 126 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126 
(208)734-1155 
ISB# 4444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
* r * * * * * * * *  
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR-06-107 
VS. AFFIDAVIT OF MARILYN B. PAUL 
1 IN SUPPORT OF EX-PARTE MOTION 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, ) FOR COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE 
1 OF WITNESS JOEL PETERSON 
Defendant. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) ss. 
County of Twin Falls. 1 
MARILYN B. PAUL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. That I am counsel for the above-named defendant. 
2. That Joel Peterson is a witness for the jury trial in the above-entitled matter. 
3. That Mr. Peterson expressed his willingness to testify in this case even 
A F F I D A V I T  -1 
though he was due to be sent on a retained jurisdiction. 
4. That Mr. Peterson is at the Receiving and Diagnostic Unit at the Idaho 
Department of Corrections. 
5. That Mr. Peterson's testimony is necessary and essential to the defendant in 
his jury trial in the above-entitled matter. 
6. That every effort will be made by the defense to ensure Mr. Peterson's 
availability to the riderlreceiving and diagnostic procedure. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT, 
DATED this day of *, 2006. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5 day of June, 2006. 
AFFIDAVIT -2  
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Telephone: (208) 734-1 155 
Fax #: 1208) 734-1 161 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 
Defendant. 
1 
) Case No. CR-06-107 
1 
EX-PARTE MOTION TO 
TRANSPORT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Juan Fuentes-Pina, by and through his attorney, 
MARILYN B. PAUL and hereby moves ex-parte for an order to transport Joel Peterson 
from the receiving and diagnostic unitlretained jurisdiction program, Boise, Idaho, to the 
Twin Falls County Jail, by the Twin Falls County Sheriffs Office, by no later than June 
22, 2006, and to be held there until he has testified in the above-entitled matter, at which 
time he shall be returned to the receiving and diagnostic unitlretained jurisdiction program 
to complete said program. 
It is anticipated that he will testify no later than June 30, 2006. 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT - 1 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays this Honorable Court grant his Motion for 
Transport. 
DATED this 5 day of June, 2006. 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO TRANSPORT was delivered to the office of the Twin Falls 
P 
County Prosecutor on the 5 day of June, 2006. 
GRANT LOEBS dcour t l iouse  Mail 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 2gg6 JuFd -5 Ph 1 : 2 1 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 BY----- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-06-107 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
v. 
1 
1 ORDER TO 
1 TRANSPORT 
JUAN FUENTES-PNA, 1 
) 
Defendant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That the Joel Peterson, be transported from the 
receiving and diagnostic unitlretained jurisdiction program, Boise, Idaho, to the Twin Falls 
County Jail by the Twin Falls County Sheriffs Office no later than June 22,2006 to be 
available to testify in the Jury Trial in the above-entitled matter, at which time he shall be 
returned to the receiving and diagnostic unitlretained jurisdiction program to complete said 
program. 
It is anticipated that he will testify no later than June 30, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT to be delivered to the following on this 
,2006. 
GRANT LOEBS Courthouse Mail 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PROSECUTING AmORNEY 
MARILYN B. PAUL 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
(j Courthouse Mail 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL $ Courthouse Mail 
JERRY 
COURT SECURITY 
Courthouse Mail 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Tel: (208) 734-1 155 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  OF^ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR 06-1 07 
VS. 
) 
1 ORDER FOR COMPULSORY 
1 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESS 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, i JOEL PETERSON 
) 
Defendant. 1 
\ 
This matter having come before the Court by the Ex-Parte Motion for Compulsory 
Attendance of Witness Joel Peterson, and GOOD CAUSE appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Joel Peterson will be in attendance in the jury trial in the 
above-entitled matter. 
ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
-4-4 
delivered to the Twin Falls County Prosecutor's on the k d a y  of June, 2006. 
GRANT LOEBS 
OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
MARILYN B. PAUL 
OFFICE OF THE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
[ ] Hand Deliver 
[ Courthouse Mail P 
[ ] Hand Deliver [v Courthouse Mail 
ORDER 
TWIN FALLS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. BOX 126 - - - - - -  
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0126 
Telephone: (208) 734-1 155 
BY-.- -- AX- 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 
Case No. CR 06-107 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through counsel, Marilyn B. Paul, and 
hereby moves to have excluded statements that violate the holding in Bvuton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
Such motion is made for the reason that while Johnny Shores, a co-defendant in this 
matter, has not yet testified in this case, it is anticipated that he will testify in the up coming 
trial. Therefore it is requested that the holding in &&m govern the admissibility of 
evidence, as that case holds that i~lstruction to the jury on this issue is insufficient to protect 
Mr. Pina's confrontation rights. Further, Cvawfovd v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 
1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), confrontation rights should control the admission of the 
evidence. 
The defendant requests exclusioi~ of the above. 
MOTION IN LIMINE -1- 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 2006. 
MOTION IN LIMINE -2- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE was delivered to the office of the Twin Falls County 
Prosecuting Attorney on the 5 day o 
GRANT LOEBS 
Twin Falls County 
Prosecuting Attorney [ 1 Fax 
MOTION IN LIMINE -3- 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Telephone: (208) 734-1 155 
Idaho State Bar # 4444 
ORIGINAL ;)!<:.T:?,fi? ,..> 
...... i : :si i ,  i ,I.ii!RT ;:: > t* 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, DJ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) Case No. CR-06-107 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
v. 1 DISMISSAL OF MOTION 
1 TO DISMISS INDICTMENT 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 
Defendant. 
1 
1 
1 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through his attorney, Marilyn B. Paul and hereby 
moves for reconsideration of the Court's decisions on the motions in the above-entitled matter; 
specifically Mr. Pina's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, with its supporting Memorandum Brief in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Indictment. 
In the Motion and Memorandum Brief, defense had addressed portions of Johnny 
Shores's purported statements that were hearsay adverse to Mr. Pina. However, Mr. Pina wishes 
MOTION - 1 
to object to Johnny Shores entire purported statement, which was hearsay, admitted for the 
consideration of the grand jury. Johnny Shores did not testify; Curtis Gambrel testified as to 
Johnny Shore's entire purported testimony. 
Mr. Pina contends that the state's instruction to the Grand Jury to not consider Johnny 
Shore's statements against Mr. Pina was insufficient iiioculation of the process to protect Mr. 
Pina from that clearly hearsay evidence being used against him. 
Mr. Pina requests that the eiitire testimony of Johnny Shores be striclcen as hearsay and 
that the indictment be dismissed and set aside. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 day of June, 2006. 
MOTION -2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to be properly delivered to the following, on this 5 day of June, 2006. 
Grant Loebs 
Prosecutor [ X ] Court Folder 
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I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Stipulation 
was delivered to GRANT LOEBS, Prosecuting Attorney on t h i s 5  day of 
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Attorneys at Law 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 Case No. CR-06-107 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
v. 1 OBJECTION TO ADMISSION 
1 OF CALL DETAIL RECORDS 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 (MOTION IN LIMINE) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
) 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through his attorney, Marilyn B. Paul and 
hereby withdraws objection to admission of call detail records found at D 436 through D 442. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 day of June, 2006 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to be properly delivered to the following, on this 5 day of June, 2006. 
Grant Loebs 
Prosecutor [ X ] Court Folder 
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CLERK 
DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR 06-107 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
v. 1 ORDER TO EXCLUDE 
1 EVIDENCE 
1 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
BASED UPON written, Stipulated Motion, and good cause appearing thereibr, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the "dust footprint" on the back door of the house, referred 
to in D 578, D 592, and D 596, among others, not be introduced. 
DATED this ,2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the day of ,2006, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on the parties and persons listed below, by 
placing said copy in the appropriately-marked mailboxifolder located in the Court Services 
Department of the Twin Falls County Courthouse: 
MARILYN B. PAUL GRANT LOEBS 
Twin Falls County Public Defender Prosec. Atty. Twin Falls County 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
1 Case No. CR-06-107 
1 
v ORDER TO WITHDRAW . . 
OBJECTION TO 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 1 ADMISSION OF CALL 
1 DETAIL RECORDS 
Defendant. j 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the objection to admission of call detail records 
found at D 436 tluough D 442 are withdrawan. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT to be delivered to the following on this 
___ day of ,2006. 
GRANT LOEBS [ ] Cowthouse Mail 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
[ ] Courthouse Mail 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL [ ] Courthouse Mail 
JERRY 
COURT SECURITY 
[ ] Courthouse Mail 
. ,.,''~T\J@~!;N AL ; (? !;, 
p t ;  - * ~  L i j  !. ji 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER . i.. ::" i .l 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Telephone: (208) 734-1 155 
Fax #: (208) 734-1 161 
ISB # 4444 ,*... - I)EpUTy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JUAN FUENTES-PINA, 
Defendant. 
1 
1 Case No. CR-06-107 
) 
1 
j 
1 MOTION TO 
1 TRANSPORT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Juan Fuentes-Pina, by and through his attorney, 
MARILYN B. PAUL and hereby moves an order to transport Jeremiah Schmidt from the 
Mini-Cassia Criminal Justice Facility, Burley, Idaho, to the Twin Falls County Jail, by the 
Twin Falls County Sheriffs Office, by no later than June 23, 2006, and to be held there 
until he has testified in the above-entitled matter, at which time he shall be returned to the 
Mini-Cassia Criminal Justice Facility. 
It is anticipated that he will testify no later than June 30, 2006. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays this Honorable Court grant his Motion for 
Transport. 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 
DATED this day of June, 2006. 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO TRANSPORT was delivered to the office of the Twin Falls 
County Prosecutor on the q day of June, 2006. 
GRANT LOEBS [d~our thouse  Mail 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208) 736-4020 
Fax: (208) 736-4120 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR 06-107 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 1 NOTICE OF INTENT TO PRESENT 404(b) 
1 EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PINA, ) 
1 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney's Office by and through its 
Attorney of Record, Grant P. Loebs, Prosecuting Attorney, and gives notice of its intent to 
present evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts at Defendant's July Trial in the above-entitled 
case. This notice is provided pursuant to I.R.E. 404(h) 
DATED this 12- day of June 2006. 
Grant P. Loebs 
Prosecuting Attorney , 
Notice of Intent to Present 404(b) Evidence at Trial - 1 i i  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
+ 
I hereby certify that on the & day of June 2006, I served a copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO PRESENT 404(b) EVIDENCE AT TRIAL thereof into the Inail 
slot for THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER located at the District Court Services 
Office and for delivery on the regular delivery route made every morning and afternoon to all 
Courthouse offices receiving mail from the Prosecutor's Office. 
- 
%acey Ihler / 
Case Assistant 
Notice of Intent to Present 404(b) Evidence at Trial - 2 
GRANT P. LOEBS 
Prosecuting Attorney 
for Twin Falls County 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Phone: (208)736-4020 
Fax: (208)736-4120 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR 06-107 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. 1 STATE'S ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST 
1 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-PmA, ) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW The Plaintiff, Grant P. Loebs, Prosecuting Attorney for Twin Falls 
County, State of Idaho, and subinits the following additional list of potential witnesses in the 
above-entitled matter: 
106. Steve Byers. 
107. Michael Guest. 
108. Adain Stanislo. 
STATE'S ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST - 1 
The State has also provided to defense counsel a separate document containing contact 
infonnation for the above-listed witnesses. 
DATED This &day of June 2006. 
Grant P: Loebs 
Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE'S ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/9Tay of June 2006, I served a copy of the foregoing I hereby certify that on the 
STATE'S ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST thereof into the mail slot for THE OFFICE OF 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER located at the District Court Services Office and for delivery on the 
regular delivery route made eveiy morning and afternoon to all Courthouse offices receiving mail 
from the Prosecutor's Office. 
Stacey Ihler / 
Felony Case Assistant 
STATE'S ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST - 3 
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FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE: COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Case No. CR-2006-0 107 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
VS. 1 MEMORANDUM PURSUANT TO 
1 I.C.R. 18 
JUAN CARLOS FUENTES-P~A, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
This matter came before the court for final pretrial conference on Monday, June 12,2006. 
The State was represented by Grant Loebs and Suzanne Craig; the Defendant was represented by 
Marilyn Paul and Stanley Holloway. 
Based upon the conference, the following matters were discussed and are hereby 
ORDERED by the court. The following constitutes the court's pretrial memorandum of items 
agreed upon and ordered pursuant to Rule 18 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
1. JURY TRIAL. Jury trial in this case will commence on Thursday, June 15,2006 
at 9:00 a.m. The court has reserved ten and one-half (10% ) days for trial. The trial will run 
from 9:00 a.m. to noon, and from 1:30 p.m. to 4:45 p.m. each day, except June 20, when the day 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 1 
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may be extended briefly to accommodate an out-of-town witness, and June 21, when the day will 
end at 3:00 p.m. to accommodate other hearings. The court will take two recesses during the 
day, at approximately 10:30 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. The final day schedule may be adjusted 
depending upon the status of the case. 
2. ADDITIONAL JURORS. Three (3) additional jurors will be selected for this 
trial. The jurors exceeding the nunber required of a regular panel will be chosen by lot at the 
conclusion of the padies' closing arguments, using the jury wheel. The jury will be comprised of 
twelve (12) persons, with the additional jurors not taking part in deliberations. 
3. JURY SELECTION AND VOIR DIRE: The struck jury selection method will 
be utilized pursuant to I.C.R. 24(e), with the final fifteen jurors being seated in the order they are 
seated in the panel as a whole prior to the exercise of any peremptory challenges. The Court will 
conduct brief initial voir dire examination designed to coizfirm that all summoned jurors are 
qualified to serve, and canllot be disqualified for obvious bias. Thereafter, the State will voir 
dire the entire jury panel, followed by the Defendant. Challenges for cause may be made at any 
time while examining a prospective juror, but in no event later than the conclusion of questioning 
of the challenged juror. Unless otherwise ordered, the parties will not be subject to any fixed or 
arbitrary time limit for voir dire, provided, however, that the Court may, in its discretion, limit or 
terminate voir dire which is excessive, repetitious, unreasonable, or argumentative. 
4. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. Pursuant to I.C.R. 24(c), each side will have 
ten (10) peremptory challenges, plus two additional challenges for the alternate jurors for a total 
of twelve (12), pursuant to I.C.R. 24(d)(l). 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 
5. ASSIGNMENT OF JUROR NUMBERS. The court will conduct a hearing on 
Tuesday, June 13, 2006 at 1:30 p.m., at which time the jurors will be assigned their numbers for 
purposes of voir dire examination. Mr. PiBa may attend if he so desires. 
6, JUROR NOTEBOOKS. The court will utilize juror notebooks pursuant to 
I.C.R. 24.1. The notebooks will contain the instructions of the court. The notebooks will also 
contain blank paper for juror notes. 
7.  EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS. When and to the extent required to respond 
to interrogatories, requests for production or other discovery requests propounded by another 
party, a party must identify and disclose any documentary, tangible or other exhibits that party 
intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair 
prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded. 
Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been propounded, no later 
than June 15, 2006, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in the 
form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, duplicate marked set of 
that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial; and (B) deliver to counsel for each 
other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate copy of that party's marked 
exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not include exhibits which will be offered 
solely for the purpose of impeachment. The Plaintiff shall identi@ exhibits beginning with 
number "1," and the Defendant shall utilize exhibits beginning with letter "A." 
8. WITNESS LISTS. The parties will each provide the court with a witness list no 
later than 8:45 a.m., Thursday, June 15,2006. 
9. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions and verdict forms requested by a 
party shall be prepared in conformity with I.C.R. 30(b), and shall he filed with the Clerk (with 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 
copies to Chambers) no later than June 14,2006 at 5:00 p.m. Counsel shall also file the 
proposed jury instructions on computer disc for easy access by the court, or via email to the 
Court's law clerk at: landerson@co.twin-fal1s.id.u~. Requested instructions not timely 
submitted may not be included in the court's preliminary or final charge. Parties may submit 
additional or supplemental instructions to address unforeseen issues or disputes arising during 
trial. To the extent possible, proposed instructions and verdict forms shall be printed in 12-point, 
"Times New Roman" typeface like that contained in this order. The Court has prepared "stock" 
instructions, copies of which can be obtained upon request. The parties may, but are not required 
to submit additional stock instructions. 
10. PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS. The c o w  will hear the parties' pre-trial motions on 
Wednesday, June 14,2006 at 4:00 p.m. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this - @ day of June, 2006. 
District Judge 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the &day of 2006, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Grant P. Loebs ( ) U.S. Mail 
Twin Falls County Prosecutor ( ) Hand delivered 
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Y ,Older 
Marilyii Paul ( ) U.S. Mail 
Public Defender ( ) Hand delivered 
Twin Falls County ( ) Faxed 
$@ Court Folder 
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